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ABSTRACT
Demand for corporate non-financial “environmental, social, and
governance” (ESG) information from investors and governments is
on the rise globally, and leading securities regulators and stock
exchanges worldwide now encourage or mandate its disclosure by
large firms. However, rising demand has been matched by growing
dissatisfaction with ESG informational gaps in financial reports, on
the one hand, and the dearth of investment-grade information in
corporate sustainability reports and other public sources, on the
other. These developments raise questions about whether the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and its counterparts in
other jurisdictions should continue to defer primarily to private
market-based approaches to ESG disclosure, reform the disclosure
framework to expressly address non-financial information, or seek
to combine elements of both public disclosure regulation and
private ordering in new ways.
This Article anticipates these policy choices by assessing the
range of approaches to ESG disclosure that have been adopted in the
United States and six other influential jurisdictions: South Africa,
Brazil, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and
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mainland China. Drawing on this comparative analysis, we find
that a public-private hybrid approach to ESG disclosure is
ultimately inevitable, and we argue that optimal approaches for
improving the quality and utility of non-financial information must
draw on the comparative advantages of both public and private
forms of disclosure regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Demand from investors and governments for corporate nonfinancial “environmental, social, and governance” (ESG)
information is on the rise globally.1 In 2018, institutional investors
representing over US$5 trillion in assets under management joined
a petition to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) urging
it to adopt new rules regarding ESG disclosure by public
companies. 2 These trends reflect mainstream investors’ growing
recognition of the relationship between material ESG factors and
financial risk and return, making the term “non-financial”
somewhat of a misnomer. 3 Over the past decade, more than 60
1
The CFA Institute has defined ESG issues as the “environmental, social, and
governance issues that [i]nvestors are considering in the context of corporate
behavior.” CFA INST. CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND
GOVERNANCE FACTORS AT LISTED COMPANIES: A MANUAL FOR INVESTORS 22 (2008).
The terms “ESG disclosure” and “non-financial reporting” (and combinations
thereof) are therefore used interchangeably in this Article even though “nonfinancial” information extends beyond ESG factors to all disclosures beyond the
financial statements. On this distinction, see Richard Barker & Robert G. Eccles,
Should FASB and IASB be Responsible for Setting Standards for Nonfinancial
Information?
6-8
(Oct.
12,
2018)
(unpublished
Green
Paper),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3272250 [https://perma.cc/NG3J-2YUP].
2 See Petition for Rulemaking on environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
disclosure from Cynthia A. Williams, Osler Chair in Bus. Law, Osgoode Hall L. Sch.
& Jill E. Fisch, Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Bus. Law, U. Pa. L. Sch. to
Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WW7Z-WR42].
3
According to surveys of institutional investors, 70 to 80 percent consider
ESG information as important or essential to investment analysis. See, e.g., Matthew
Nelson, Is Your Non-financial Performance Revealing the True Value of Your Business to
Investors?, ERNST & YOUNG 6 (Nov. 29, 2017) [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG 2017],
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY__Nonfinancial_performance_may_influence_investors/$FILE/ey-nonfinancialperformance-may-influence-investors.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RCY3-R9NW]
(indicating that over half of the investors surveyed believe current non-financial
information provided by companies is inadequate for meaningful comparison);
Sustainability Goes Mainstream: Insights Into Investor Views, PWC 6–9 (2014),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/pwc-investor-resourceinstitute/publications/assets/pwc-sustainability-goes-mainstream-investorviews.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4P7-837R] (determining that over three-quarters of
surveyed investors consider sustainability issues to mitigate risk); Tomorrow’s
Investment
Rules
2.0,
ERNST
&
YOUNG
13
(2015),
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governments4 and international institutions, including the United
Nations, 5 the OECD, 6 the G20, 7 the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 8 the Worldwide Federation of

https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-ccass-institutional-investorsurvey-2015/$FILE/ey-ccass-institutional-investor-survey-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/753Z-YLVL] (citing analysts and investors who consider ESG
factors as important to gauging the risk and value of investments); Kiran
Vasantham & David Shammai, 2019 Institutional Investor Survey, MORROW SONDALI
15–16 (2019), https://www.morrowsodali.com/news/institutional-investorsurvey-2019, [https://perma.cc/6DCL-A6GK] (finding that 80
percent of
institutional investors support integrating ESG factors into mandatory reporting).
4 See, e.g., Wim Bartels et al., Carrots & Sticks: Global Trends in Sustainability
Reporting Regulation and Policy, KPMG INT’L ET AL. (2016) (surveying various
countries and their reporting standards with respect to ESG factors); Enterprise Risk
Management: Applying Enterprise Risk Management to Environmental Social and
Governance-related Risks, COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N. &
WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 4, note g (Oct. 2018),
https://www.coso.org/Documents/COSO-WBCSD-ESGERM-Guidance-Full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YT8X-63LQ] (citing data showing that over 60 governments
have adopted such measures); U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World
Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones 116–124 (2019) (highlighting capital
market policies and instruments that promote sustainable development).
5
See About the PRI Initiative, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
https://www.unpri.org/about-pri/about-pri/ [https://perma.cc/U6B3-TZW5]
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (describing the United Nations’ voluntary framework
for institutional investors who commit to engaging with corporations on nonfinancial performance).
6
See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
Investment Governance and the Integration of Environmental, Social, and Governance
(2017),
https://www.oecd.org/finance/Investment-GovernanceFactors
Integration-ESG-Factors.pdf [https://perma.cc/33J3-LC86].
7 See Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures | TCFD—About the Task
Force, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, https://www.fsbtcfd.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/EF9L-JUYY] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019)
(explaining the mandate of the TCFD and its formation by the G20’s Financial
Stability Board).
8
See Press Release, Sustainable Stock Exch. Initiative, IOSCO having active
dialogue on sustainability, (July 9, 2018), https://www.sseinitiative.org/homeslider/iosco-having-active-dialogue-on-sustainability/ [https://perma.cc/J7LYHQPW].
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Exchanges,9 the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB),10
and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO),11 have
also considered how to promote non-financial reporting in order to
facilitate the valuation of corporate environmental and social risks
and advance global sustainable development. 12 Both objectives
require that investment-grade ESG information be accessible to
investors and other financial market participants.
However, non-financial reporting has historically been largely
voluntary and driven by various forms of private ordering,
including corporate engagement with shareholders and other
stakeholders, reliance on private standard-setters and private
governance regimes to promote corporate accountability and
transparency, and self-regulation by companies, such as voluntary
sustainability reporting and corporate social responsibility (CSR)
9
See James Langton, WFE Launches Sustainability Working Group | Investment
EXEC.
(Mar.
25,
2014),
Executive,
INV.
https://www.investmentexecutive.com/news/industry-news/wfe-launchessustainability-working-group/ [https://perma.cc/752Z-C3N3] (indicating that
stock exchanges from around the world have created a working group to promote
sustainable investment); Press Release, The World Fed’n of Exch., The World Fed’n.
of Exch. Publishes Five Sustainability Principles for Member Exch. (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.world-exchanges.org/news/articles/world-federation-exchangespublishes-five-sustainability-principles-member-exchanges
[https://perma.cc/Y7D9-KZWC] (affirming its active role in promoting
sustainable investment).
10 See Hans Hoogervorst, Chair, Int’l. Accounting Standards Bd., IASB Chair’s
Speech: The times, they are a-changin’, (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.ifrs.org/newsand-events/2017/09/iasb-chairmans-speech-the-times-the-are-achangin/
[https://perma.cc/36YJ-8Y2S] (noting the IASB’s support for ESG disclosure
harmonization efforts).
11
The ISO has established a technical committee to develop standards for “the
integrating of sustainability considerations and [ESG] practices into institutional
investment decision making and wider finance management.” ISO, ISO/TC322 –
Sustainable
Finance,
Int’l.
Org.
for
Standardization,
https://www.iso.org/committee/7203746.html [https://perma.cc/C2P7-T8TA]
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
12 See Commission Interim Report on Financing a Sustainable European Economy,
at 20–22 (July 2017) [hereinafter EU Report on Sustainable Finance],
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/170713-sustainable-financereport_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/TB26-JAFA] (discussing trends in disclosure to
promote sustainable investment in the European Union). See also U.N. Sustainable
Development
Goals,
About
the
Sustainable
Development
Goals,
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/
[https://perma.cc/AWU7-GXM6] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (providing an
overview of the United Nations’ official platform for sustainable development).
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commitments. 13 While private ordering has led companies to
provide more ESG information to the public, the proliferation of
competing private standards and the lack of alignment between
voluntary sustainability reporting and disclosure produced in
corporate annual reports and other public filings have reduced the
usefulness of ESG information for investment analysis.14 In sum,
rising demand for investment-grade information has been
accompanied by growing dissatisfaction with the limited and highly
variable ESG information disclosed in financial reports, on the one
hand, and the dearth of investment-grade information in corporate
sustainability reports and other sources outside corporate annual
reports, on the other.15
Since non-financial reporting practice depends so heavily on
private standards and other forms of private ordering, these
developments are prompting new questions about whether the SEC
and its counterparts in other jurisdictions should continue to defer
primarily to private standards, voluntary frameworks and other
market-based approaches to ESG disclosure, or should update
current reporting regimes to standardize how non-financial
information reaches investors. If reforms are needed, another
critical question is whether regulatory responses should displace
private ordering or instead seek to combine elements of both public
disclosure regulation and private ordering in new ways.
As this Article shows, answers to these fundamental questions
are already being explored outside of the United States as regulators
throughout the world leverage private sector innovation in order to
address gaps in the quality and reliability of non-financial reporting.
For example, many governments have incorporated existing private
ESG disclosure standards into new rules or guidelines by reference
or have drawn on these standards as a starting point in developing

13 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Standardization in Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
and a Universalist Concept of CSR?—A Path Paved with Good Intentions, 22 FLA. J. INT’L
L. 361, 362–363 (2010) (contrasting the treatment of financial and non-financial
reporting); see also Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure & the Costs of
Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 407 (2018) [hereinafter Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk
Disclosure] (arguing that the current system of voluntary disclosure of non-financial
information is inadequate for meaningful comparative analysis and requires
standardization and regulation).
14 See infra Section 1.3.
15 See infra Section 1.3.
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their own ESG disclosure rules. 16 Beyond standard-setting,
regulators have also sought to improve the reliability of nonfinancial reporting by encouraging firms to obtain third-party
assurance of ESG information.17
This emphasis on private ordering in ESG disclosure is
grounded in extensive research within and outside of the legal
literature on the comparative advantages and effectiveness of
various forms of private governance, public-private partnerships,
and related phenomena often referred to broadly as “private
regulation.” 18 In particular, the literature on public-private
“hybridity” explores how to optimize the interactions between
government regulators and private governance regimes acting
under their own respectively defined powers in pluralistic legal
systems.19
Notwithstanding the prominent role of private ordering in
corporate transparency, we have argued in prior work that
governments have important roles to play in improving the quality
and quantity of non-financial reporting.20 This Article is the first to
consider how national financial regulators can draw on private
standards, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms as they
pursue these important goals.

See infra Section 3.
See infra Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 (discussing such efforts in the European
Union and the United Kingdom, respectively).
18
See infra Section 2.2. The term “private ordering” is widely used in
corporate law to refer to the use of private contracting and negotiation as an
alternative to statutory mandates; similarly, the term “private regulation” is used
in the governance literature to refer broadly to alternatives to state regulation. In
this Article, we endeavor to bring these two literatures together by using the latter
to capture private standards and other private governance regimes and the former
as a broader term that also includes private regulation.
19 See Gráinne De Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance, Law and
Constitutionalism, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 1, 8 (Gráinne
De Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006). See also Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a
Jurisprudence of Hybridity, 1 UTAH L. REV. 11, 12 (2010) (proposing hybridity as a
means to govern the interactions of state and non-state lawmaking by multiple
communities).
20
See generally Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure, supra note 13
(advocating for an SEC framework); Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency
as Global Corporate Strategy, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87 (2014) [hereinafter Park,
Targeted Social Transparency] (analyzing the rise of mandatory disclosure under
securities law of specific human rights impacts).
16
17
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To inform these policy choices, this Article assesses the range of
approaches to ESG disclosure that have been adopted in the United
States and six other influential capital markets: South Africa, Brazil,
the European Union, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and
mainland China.21 Each of these jurisdictions has implemented ESG
disclosure through a different balance of public regulation and
private ordering. As a group, these countries include many of the
largest capital markets, globally or regionally. They also represent
variation in terms of market size, level of economic development,
geography, and legal system.22
Drawing on this comparative analysis, we find that a publicprivate hybrid approach to ESG disclosure is ultimately inevitable,
and we argue that optimal approaches for improving the quality
and utility of non-financial information must draw on the respective
advantages of public and private forms of regulation. Toward this
end, this Article identifies how non-financial reporting reforms in
the U.S. context can leverage, harmonize, and legitimize private
ordering.
Section 1 of this Article identifies the forces that are driving
greater investor demand for ESG information and describes
regulatory efforts to improve the comparability, reliability, and
quality of ESG information available to the capital markets. Section
2 explores a central tension in non-financial reporting reform
between the standard investor-oriented rationales for mandatory
disclosure—namely, to promote investor protection, market
efficiency, and stability—and the stakeholder-oriented goals of
voluntary ESG disclosure and private regulation.23 Section 2 then
presents a typology of how public regulation and private ordering
interact that is particularly relevant to ESG disclosure. Section 3
21
Because of Hong Kong’s special status under the concept of “one country
two systems,” its financial and legal regimes are distinct from those in mainland
China. In this Article, we separately address rules that apply to companies
incorporated or listed in Hong Kong and those incorporated or listed in mainland
China. See infra Sections 3.2.6 and 3.2.7.
22
For a comparison of these features across the selected jurisdictions, see
Appendix I infra.
23
As is standard in the literature, we use the term “mandatory” to refer to
reporting requirements imposed by regulators even though in most mandatory
reporting regimes, such as those that apply under U.S. federal securities law, not all
reporting rules are prescriptive and companies exercise some discretion in
determining whether disclosure of particular information is required.
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applies this typology to the comparative case studies. This analysis
shows how regulators are drawing on and yielding to private
disclosure regimes in reforming the reporting rules that apply to
companies’ annual reports and other public filings. Section 4 draws
on observations from the case studies to identify ways in which
governments can optimize the roles of public regulation and private
ordering in ESG disclosure.
1.

UNDERSTANDING ESG DISCLOSURE GAPS

More than 85 percent of the S&P 500 in the United States and
more than 90 percent of the largest firms globally now produce
sustainability reports that disclose ESG information in some form;
some companies also voluntarily include sustainability or other
non-financial concepts in their annual reports or proxy statements.24
However, higher rates of voluntary reporting have not resolved, and
indeed may exacerbate, ESG information gaps. 25 In response,
private standard setters, auditors, and investors and firms
themselves, as well as international organizations and regulators
worldwide, are working to understand how best to enhance the
accessibility, reliability, and comparability of material non-financial

24
Flash Report: 86% of S&P 500 Index® Companies Publish Sustainability /
Responsibility Reports in 2018, GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY INST., INC. (May 16,
2019), https://www.ga-institute.com/press-releases/article/flash-report-86-ofsp-500-indexR-companies-publish-sustainability-responsibility-reports-in-20.html
[https://perma.cc/ZV6Q-JN5R]; IRRC INST. & SUSTAINABLE INVS. INST. (SI2), STATE
OF INTEGRATED AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 2018 3 (2018) [hereinafter IRRC],
https://siinstitute.org/special_report.cgi?id=77
[https://perma.cc/TM7NHVZR].
25 See, e.g., IRRC, supra note 24, at 26–33 (discussing the varying materiality
standards, audiences, and levels of assurance that apply to voluntary reporting);
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-398, RETIREMENT PLAN INVESTING:
CLEARER INFORMATION ON CONSIDERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND
GOVERNANCE FACTORS WOULD BE HELPFUL 18–19 (2018) [hereinafter GAO]
(reporting asset managers and retirement plan representatives’ concerns that there
is insufficient information regarding ESG factor impacts on investment
performance); TCFD, FINAL REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON
CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 33 (2017) [hereinafter TCFD FINAL
REPORT],
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINALTCFD-Report-062817.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWP4-DTS5] (noting non-uniform
locations of climate-related disclosures in required financial reporting documents).
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information to investors. 26 This effort is particularly challenging
because non-financial information that may not be material to
investors is also important to other corporate stakeholders.
In the following discussion, we explain the factors behind rising
demand for ESG information, and how ESG information reaches the
capital markets. We also consider the evidence behind the claims
that ESG information asymmetries exist and that they undermine
market efficiency.27 These observations provide important context
for the analysis in Section 2 of the relationship between private
ordering and traditional public disclosure regulation and, in turn,
establish the foundation for this Article’s core argument that
disclosure regulation both can and should draw on private ordering.
1.1. Factors Driving Demand for ESG Information
Companies around the world are now facing growing demand
for ESG information from shareholders, 28 creditors, 29 insurers, 30
26 See PRI, GLOBAL GUIDE TO RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT REGULATION 3 (2016),
https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=325
[https://perma.cc/634T-QU2G]
(surveying responsible investment policies in the top fifty national economies by
GDP and finding that all but Iran have policy initiatives on ESG factors and
investment). See also supra note 4 and sources cited therein (surveying global
policies on ESG disclosure).
27
See infra notes 34–43 and accompanying text. This claim is a central
conclusion of the TCFD’s global review of climate-related disclosure, and an
underpinning of all recent work on the integration of non-financial information into
financial reporting. See, e.g., TCFD, PHASE I REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATERELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 13 (2016) [hereinafter TCFD PHASE I],
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/Phase_I_Report_v15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X74LZ9V9]. Testing this claim empirically is beyond the scope of this paper. For a
review of the literature, see Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business
Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647 (2016) (presenting evidence
of the economic relevance to investors of non-financial information on risk).
28 See supra note 3 and sources cited therein.
29 See generally Stephen Kim Park, Investors as Regulators: Green Bonds and the
Governance Challenges of the Sustainable Finance Revolution, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2018)
[hereinafter Park, Investors as Regulators] (discussing the global market for bonds
earmarked to finance “green” projects).
30
See Climate Risk Disclosure, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS (NAIC),
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_climate_risk_disclosure.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZJ76-4FVG] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
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rating agencies,31 and financial regulators.32 In the past, demand for
non-financial information focused solely on how corporate
operations impacted workers, the environment, or human rights,
and pressure for greater transparency came primarily from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), consumers, and other public
stakeholders who urged companies to become more socially
responsible. In some markets, including the United States, they
were joined by investors who sought non-financial information
primarily to address ethical or public policy issues associated with
their investments. 33 Companies paid far less attention to the
business and financial risks associated with these issues or to
whether non-financial information might be material to mainstream
investors.
Times have changed. According to the London Stock Exchange,
ESG-related information “has moved from a ‘peripheral’ to a ‘core’
part of investment analysis, across all asset classes.” 34 Most
institutional investors now expect companies to make materiality
determinations about the financial impact of their environmental
and social (i.e., employment-related) practices, in addition to
increasing transparency around more traditional non-financial
factors such as corporate governance.35 Although the materiality of
particular ESG factors to investors varies according to industry
31
See, e.g., Environmental, Social and Governance, FITCH RATINGS,
https://www.fitchratings.com/site/esg [https://perma.cc/P9RZ-R9DL] (last
visited Sept. 27, 2019) (explaining a new system developed to show how ESG factors
may impact individual credit ratings).
32 See generally IOSCO, STATEMENT ON DISCLOSURE OF ESG MATTERS BY ISSUERS
(2019),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD619.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MD2J-FTEX] (describing the key role that regulators play in
encouraging issuers to disclose material ESG factors to investors); TCFD FINAL
REPORT, supra note 25 (referencing climate-related disclosure requirements and
giving recommendations for areas where these requirements could be improved to
reduce risk).
33 See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 22, 130 (2005); Lloyd Kurtz, Socially Responsible
Investment and Shareholder Activism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 249, 250–61 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the
different forms and rationales of responsible investment).
34
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE GROUP, YOUR GUIDE TO ESG REPORTING 3 (2018),
https://www.lseg.com/sites/default/files/content/images/Green_Finance/ESG
/2018/February/LSEG_ESG_report_January_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9T86H5D].
35 See supra note 3 and sources cited therein.
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sector and requires a firm-specific analysis, 36 the financial
materiality of a wide range of ESG information is supported by
empirical research across asset classes and, over time, has
demonstrated the impact of many ESG factors on firm and portfoliolevel risk and return, both individually and in the aggregate.37 Like
the governments and other international institutions referenced
earlier,38 IOSCO, the primary governance body of national securities
and financial regulators, has affirmed this view, stating “ESG
matters, though sometimes characterized as non-financial, may
have a material short-term and long-term impact on the business
operations of the issuers as well as on risks and returns for investors
and their investment and voting decisions.”39
Mainstream investors are also beginning to view ESG
information as material to voting decisions and as a focus of direct
engagement with companies.40 One key reason is that investors also
see effective management of environmental and social risk as part of
sound corporate governance and as a driver of long-term
profitability. 41 In global capital markets, institutional investors,
which are signatories to the United Nations Principles for
36
On the sector-specific nature of ESG materiality, see GAO, supra note 25, at
5–6 (raising the fact that there is large-scale sectoral variation regarding climate
risk); TCFD PHASE I, supra note 27 (observing similar variation). See also Robert G.
Eccles et al., The Need for Sector-Specific Materiality and Sustainability Reporting
Standards, 24 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 65 (2012) (advocating sectoral disclosure
standards).
37 See, e.g., Gunnar Friede, Timo Busch & Alexander Bassen, ESG and Financial
Performance: Aggregated Evidence from More Than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. SUSTAIN.
FIN. 210–33 (2015) (analyzing studies and meta-studies since the 1970s); GORDON L.
CLARK ET AL., FROM THE STOCKHOLDER TO THE STAKEHOLDER: HOW SUSTAINABILITY
CAN
DRIVE
FINANCIAL
OUTPERFORMANCE
(2015),
https://arabesque.com/research/From_the_stockholder_to_the_stakeholder_we
b.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6WF-FPV7] (surveying academic studies). See also GAO,
supra note 25, at 8, 23–24 (discussing results of a U.S. Department of Labor review
of the literature in 2017 that reached similar conclusions).
38 See supra notes 5–12 and sources cited therein.
39
IOSCO, supra note 32, at 1.
40
See generally GAO, supra note 25 (identifying how asset managers
incorporate ESG factors into investment management); Principles and Policies,
VANGUARD,
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/principlespolicies/ [https://perma.cc/TM8K-8QY8] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (describing
how voting, advocacy, and investment policies integrate ESG factors).
41 See GAO, supra note 25, at 23–24 (finding that asset managers who use ESG
information do so primarily to achieve “enhanced risk management” and
“improved long-term performance”).
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Responsible Investment (PRI), commit to integrate ESG information
into their investment analysis and to use their influence to promote
better corporate ESG performance and transparency; these investors
now represent over US$80 trillion in total assets under
management. 42 Their impact is particularly visible in the United
States, where such investors hold one-fifth of all assets under
management and where ESG issues are a consistent focus of
shareholder activism.43 As a result of these changes, the perceived
divide between financial and non-financial performance is
shrinking.
Although they are not the primary beneficiaries of corporate
financial reporting, governments and regulators are also beginning
to recognize the need for ESG risk disclosure to inform public policy,
including financial regulation. Issues where informed policymaking requires reliable non-financial data include questions
regarding the role of corporations and financial institutions in
promoting sustainable development goals,44 government responses
to global threats, such as climate change and cybersecurity risk,45
and the development of “sustainable finance” policies that can help
capital markets direct capital to more environmentally sustainable
uses.46 Governments are also considering ESG disclosure reform in

42
IRRC, supra note 24, at 12. At its inception in 2006, this figure was US$6.3
trillion. Id.
43
GAO, supra note 25, at 9. See infra Section 3.2.1 (discussing investors’ role
in pushing for broader ESG disclosure in the United States).
44
See,
e.g.,
SDG
Compass,
https://sdgcompass.org/
[https://perma.cc/EH7P-XCGD] (aiding companies in promoting the Sustainable
Development Goals).
45 See, e.g., EU REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE FINANCE, supra note 12 (considering
sustainable finance policies and regulation); TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at
iii (recommending disclosure to aid better climate-related public policy).
46 See generally TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25. See also Guiding Opinions
on Establishing the Green Financial System ( 关 于 构 建 金 融 体 系 的 指 导 意 见 )
(promulgated by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), China Ministry of Fin. (MOF),
Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n (NDRC), China Ministry of Envtl. Prot. (MEP), China
Banking Reg. Comm’n (CBRC), China Sec. Reg. Comm’n (CSRC), and China Ins.
Reg. Comm’n (CIRC), Aug. 31, 2016, effective Aug. 31, 2016) (articulating policy
goals and an action plan for “greening” China’s financial system).
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accountability and transparency.47

for

greater
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corporate

1.2. Sources of ESG Information
To be sure, the sheer volume of non-financial information
reaching the capital markets has grown exponentially over the past
few decades as sustainability and CSR concepts have gained broad
acceptance in the market and among corporate boards. Most
obviously, public regulatory agencies, such as environmental or
labor protection agencies, may impose reporting obligations,48 but
this information is not intended for investors or reported with
reference to financial materiality, making it difficult to incorporate
in financial analysis. 49 Instead, ESG disclosure has largely been
driven by private ordering, as private standard-setters and other
market actors have created a vast array of reporting obligations,
frameworks, and standards that capture non-financial information
in various forms.
Despite the expansion of private disclosure frameworks and the
relatively limited extent of non-financial information disclosed in
corporations’ public filings, 50 investors prefer to obtain ESG
information from companies’ annual reports, proxy statements, and
other mandatory filings because of their perceived reliability.51 For
the same reason, mandatory filings are the primary data source for
ESG databases, such as Bloomberg’s ESG suite and others widely
used by financial analysts.

47 See, e.g. Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs on corporate social responsibility:
accountable, transparent and responsible business behavior and sustainable growth
(2012/2098(INI)), A7-0017/2013, Jan. 28 2013) [hereinafter EU Parliament CSR
Report] (noting public demand in Europe for greater corporate accountability); see
also IRRC, supra note 24, at 10–11 (discussing changing public expectations as
driving demand for better corporate disclosures).
48
Bartels et al., supra note 4, at 14 (aggregating these measures).
49
TCFD PHASE I, supra note 27, at 8, 13; TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at
1–2.
50
On the limitations of non-financial information contained in public filings,
see generally infra Section 1.3.
51
ERNST & YOUNG 2017, supra note 3, at 18.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

264

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:2

In over 60 jurisdictions, ESG disclosure in some form is required
or encouraged as a matter of financial regulation, corporate law, or
stock exchange listing rules.52 According to a 2018 report from the
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Institute, 40 percent
of S&P 500 companies mention sustainability information in their
annual reports or proxy statements (excluding disclosures of risk
factors or environmental matters).53 Globally, nearly 80 percent of
the 250 world’s largest companies reportedly include some kind of
ESG information in their annual reports, a trend linked to the rise in
regulatory measures on ESG disclosure. 54 At present, however,
most publicly available ESG information is produced outside
companies’ public filings and is intended for a broad range of
stakeholders. These sources include information provided on
corporate websites or in corporate sustainability reports whose
content and format is determined by each company and that are
based on guidelines set more often by private standard setters than
by securities regulation. These private standards and other forms of
private regulation have proliferated over the past two decades,
laying the groundwork for many of the reporting regimes now being
developed by governments and international organizations.
Generally, these reporting frameworks are created by private or
quasi-private NGOs, at times with support from international
organizations or governments, and typically with sustained input
from corporations and other stakeholders. The most prominent of
these is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)’s framework, which
covers a comprehensive range of ESG topics. 55 Others focus on
environmental and climate-related indicators 56 or apply only to
52
More than 70 governments have now adopted sustainability reporting
measures;
80
percent
are
mandatory.
Reporting
Exchange,
https://www.reportingexchange.com
[https://perma.cc/56FH-FTLT]
(subscription based) (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
53
IRRC, supra note 24, at 32–33.
54
See KPMG, THE ROAD AHEAD: THE KPMG SURVEY OF CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY
REPORTING
2017,
at
21
(2017),
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/10/kpmg-survey-ofcorporate-responsibility-reporting-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/RY83-2BKP].
55
See
Global
Reporting
Initiative,
GRI
Standards,
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards [https://perma.cc/H9UQ-BWX8]
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
56
See, e.g., CDP, About Us, https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us
[https://perma.cc/N6KP-HZFL] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
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certain sectors.57 Many firms also draw on CSR standards, such as
the ISO 26000 CSR guidelines, 58 the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines), 59 or the United
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(Guiding Principles),60 which have been developed by international
organizations. Increasingly, these standards include a mix of
qualitative and quantitative ESG performance indicators that
companies may elect to use. However, only a few, such as the
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) sector-specific
indicators,61 the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC)’s
integrated reporting framework, 62 and the Climate Disclosure
Project (CDP)’s environmental reporting standards,63 are designed
to help companies integrate ESG information into their annual
reports based on existing materiality standards.
In addition to these sources, more than 100 sustainability rating
companies regularly distribute ESG questionnaires to companies
worldwide in order to generate proprietary, comparable ESG data.64
These vary widely in terms of the ultimate end-user (investor or
57
See, e.g., EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (EITI),
https://eiti.org/ [https://perma.cc/RR5S-VP9B] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
58
ISO 26000 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, https://www.iso.org/iso-26000-socialresponsibility.html [https://perma.cc/XQ9A-QYU2] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
59
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD
Guidelines
for
Multinational
Enterprises,
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/1922428.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7R94ZUE] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
60
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding
Principles
on
Business
and
Human
Rights,
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_
eN.pdf [https://perma.cc/B67B-AY3C] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
61
The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has developed
sector-specific indicators based on the legal definition of materiality that applies
under
federal
securities
law.
SASB,
Standard-Setting
Process,
https://www.sasb.org/approach/our-process/ [https://perma.cc/5NG5-3DTS]
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
62
INTEGRATED
REPORTING,
https://integratedreporting.org
[https://perma.cc/5NG5-3DTS] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
63
Who
We
Are,
CDP,
https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us
[https://perma.cc/N6KP-HZFL] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
64
See
generally
Generic
Surplus
About
Us,
GISR,
https://ratesustainability.org/about/why-gisr/ [https://perma.cc/Z8YQ-2TT4]
(introducing its effort to coordinate, harmonize, and render transparent ESG
ratings) (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
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consumer), scope and content (particular indicators and ESG issues
covered), and in the underlying methodologies that produce the
ratings. 65 In addition, companies receive questionnaires and
shareholder proposals from their shareholders seeking specific ESG
information.66 This type of uncoordinated approach to disclosure is
costly for both companies and investors and is unconnected to
disclosures in public filings.67
1.3. The State of ESG Disclosure
Despite the amount of ESG information produced by companies,
evidence from investor surveys and extensive research by the TCFD,
OECD, and the United Nations indicate that although ESG
disclosure may have important impacts on corporate behavior,
current ESG disclosure practices do not generate the level or quality
of ESG information needed for investment analysis and efficient risk
pricing and capital allocation.68 These information asymmetries are
due to the voluntary nature of most ESG disclosure and, perhaps
ironically, to the very wealth of private disclosure initiatives. The
expansion of ESG-oriented investment tools, services, and voluntary
frameworks has not only increased the volume of publicly available
ESG information, but has made the job of identifying which
information is material from a financial standpoint more difficult.
To the extent ESG-related information asymmetries persist, they can
be expected to reduce market efficiency and perhaps mislead

Id.
Sustainability Goes Mainstream: Insights Into Investor Views 7 (2014),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/pwc-investor-resourceinstitute/publications/assets/pwc-sustainability-goes-mainstream-investorviews.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4P7-837R] (finding that 89 percent of investors
surveyed were “very likely” to seek ESG information through questionnaires).
67
For a more complete discussion on this point, see Harper Ho, Non-Financial
Risk Disclosure, supra note 13, at 453–55.
68
See TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25; at i–ii (concluding that the
inadequacies of current disclosure standards and the lack of information on the
financial impacts of climate change may impair the accurate pricing of securities).
See also supra note 3, and sources cited therein (reporting institutional investor
views).
65
66
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investors as to the true nature of their investment risk.69 Ineffective
disclosure also shines a weak light on areas of real risk to corporate
stakeholders that companies should be incentivized to address.
The first challenge is that ESG information contained in annual
reports and other mandatory filings is quite limited and varies
widely, making meaningful comparison difficult. 70 In the United
States, fear of litigation leads many companies to limit disclosure of
forward-looking information and to provide generic risk disclosures
in their annual reports.71 There is also evidence that the structure of
the current federal disclosure system and the courts’ approach to
securities fraud cases have contributed to the under-reporting of
even known material risks.72
As noted earlier, many international organizations have begun
to actively promote ESG disclosure and are supporting efforts to
standardize how companies report on their non-financial
performance.73 Among the most prominent efforts are the voluntary
69
There is already emerging empirical evidence of ESG information
asymmetries. See Harrison Hong et al., Climate Risks and Market Efficiency, 208 J.
ECONOMETRICS 265 (2019) (analyzing cross-sectional data on climate risk from thirty
countries).
70
See SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (SASB), THE STATE OF
DISCLOSURE
REPORT
(2016),
https://www.sasb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/StateofDisclosure-Report-113016v21.pdf?__hstc=105637852.3b9784be80b3bcb8619b39bd91cce44e.1571883159156.1571
883159156.1571883159156.1&__hssc=105637852.2.1571883159156
[https://perma.cc/HS7P-GU65] (analyzing over 700 filings, including 597 10-K
filers and 116 20-F filers, across 434 disclosure topics).
71 See id. at 2 (reporting that the most common form of sustainability disclosure
to the SEC—across the majority of industries and topics—was generic boilerplate
language); Letter from Davis Polk & Wardwell, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC at 10
(July 22, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-313.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7NCE-R9AL] (stating that companies “generally limit their
voluntary forward-looking disclosure to … investor presentations that are
‘furnished’ with the Commission under Form 8-K rather than in ‘filed’ periodic or
current reports in response to the heightened litigation risk associated with
documents that may be included or incorporated into a registration statement or
prospectus and therefore subject to Section 11 and Section 12 of the Securities Act.”).
72 See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures: Securities Fraud
Liability in the Shadow of a Corporate Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 967 (2019).
73 See supra notes 5–11 and sources cited therein. The IASB, FASB, and many
of the private standard setters and international organizations who have focused
on ESG disclosure have formed a Corporate Reporting Dialogue which aims to
harmonize and standardize existing frameworks. See CORPORATE REPORTING
DIALOGUE, https://corporatereportingdialogue.com/ [https://perma.cc/YX3JTCKU] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
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guidelines developed by the G20’s Task Force on Climate-Related
Disclosure (TCFD), which were released in 2017. 74 The TCFD
Recommendations are expressly intended to promote disclosure of
ESG information on the basis of the same materiality standards that
apply to financial reporting, to apply to financial institutions as well
as companies outside the financial sector, and to encourage the
integration of material ESG information into companies’ annual
reports.75
ESG information provided in sustainability reports also lacks
consistency in both format and content, and so lacks the
comparability required for investment and voting purposes. Private
third-party frameworks for sustainability reporting often encourage
companies to identify their own key stakeholders, and to define
materiality in terms of corporate impacts on stakeholders, rather
than in terms of financial impact or relevance to investors.76 The
IRRC’s 2018 study found that most companies do not follow a single
voluntary reporting framework, but instead adopt their own “style,
format, and content,” making comparisons across companies
extremely difficult.77 Although many leading reporting frameworks
encourage companies to clearly indicate how they have defined
materiality in their sustainability reports, many companies do not
do so. 78 As a result, the information disclosed in voluntary
sustainability reports is not readily comparable over time for the
same firm, or across firms, sectors, and reporting frameworks. 79
Voluntary sustainability reporting is also far from universal, as it is
less common among smaller public companies.80

74
See generally TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25 (recommending a
framework for climate-related financial disclosures to allow stakeholders to make
informed decisions economic and climate-related decisions).
75 Id.
76 See IRRC, supra note 24, at 26–27 (discussing this problem); TCFD FINAL
REPORT, supra note 25, at iii, 5–11, tbls. 1 & 2 (explaining alternative definitions of
materiality in the sustainability context).
77
See IRRC, supra note 24, at 5, 31–32 (finding that 97 percent of reporting
companies chose to customize instead of following one reporting framework, and
that 25 percent of reporting companies did not disclose use of a specific framework).
78 Id.
79
Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure, supra note 13, at 428–30; Park,
Targeted Social Transparency, supra note 20, at 93.
80
ERNST & YOUNG 2017, supra note 3, at 18.
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Disclosure made under private frameworks is even more
difficult for investors to integrate with periodic reporting, and it is
more costly for investors to obtain, since there is no central reporting
repository akin to the SEC’s EDGAR platform. The information is
also less reliable, since companies are not required to obtain
independent third-party auditing or assurance, although most
frameworks and some governments encourage it.81
The plethora of competing private standards and reporting
frameworks also reduces the comparability and consistency of
disclosure, creating confusion and increased costs for investors, as
well as higher liability risk for companies.82 Ongoing efforts to align
financial and non-financial reporting are being confronted by the
different needs of investors and stakeholders. 83 All of these
limitations are driving regulatory responses to non-financial
reporting, different components of which are examined in Parts II
and III.
2.

PRIVATE STANDARDS AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

With the growth of non-financial reporting and the problems
posed by the proliferation of different voluntary frameworks and
practices, governments considering non-financial reporting reforms
must address already existing private ESG disclosure regimes and
other forms of private ordering. The following discussion begins by
describing mandatory disclosure regimes, typically adopted by
securities and financial regulators and stock exchanges, and
81 See, e.g., GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE AND GLOB. SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS
BOARD, GRI 102: GENERAL DISCLOSURES, DISCLOSURE 102–56, 41 (2016),
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/gri-standards-downloadcenter/?g=51c631dd-b541-4a63-ad4b-5f7d38502d78
[https://perma.cc/XMQ58DJG] (recommending standards for the use and disclosure of external assurance
of reports).
82
See IRRC, supra note 24, at 16–24 (surveying the “sea of sustainability
reporting models”); Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure, supra note 13, at 452–
56 (identifying how relying on voluntary reporting raises costs to companies and to
investors).
83
See Better Alignment Project, CORPORATE REPORTING DIALOGUE (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://corporatereportingdialogue.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/Corporate-Reporting-Dialogue-Better-AlignmentProject.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6EJ-Z8SN].
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comparing them with voluntary reporting based on private
standards. Incorporating theoretical and empirical research in law,
business ethics, management studies, public policy, and political
science, we identify a range of modes of interaction between public
regulation and private standards as a foundation for considering the
comparative examples of ESG disclosure reform presented in
Section 3.
2.1. Disclosure Rationales
Since most of the world’s largest companies already produce
some form of voluntary non-financial reporting, the initial question
for many governments is whether to continue to allow market-based
practices to evolve without regulatory intervention. Answering this
question requires revisiting many of the traditional rationales for
mandatory disclosure and asking whether voluntary non-financial
reporting and private ordering meet those goals. If governments are
already considering how to address the non-financial information
gaps described above, they must also understand that voluntary
non-financial reporting and the disclosure contained in corporate
annual reports or proxy statements are based on different
materiality standards since they are produced for different
audiences. The following discussion outlines these key differences
as a preface to the typology of public-private interaction that follows
in Section 2.2.
2.1.1. Investor-Oriented Rationales and Goals of Public Mandatory
Disclosure
According to IOSCO, the core purpose of mandatory disclosure
under the securities laws or stock exchange listing rules is to protect
investors from fraud, to promote “fair, efficient and transparent
markets,” and to reduce systemic risk, all of which require that
financial market participants have timely access to reliable
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information.84 In the United States, the SEC has also stated its core
mission in these terms.85 By increasing confidence in the integrity of
the capital markets, mandatory disclosure also supports market
In
liquidity, stability, and ultimately capital formation. 86
jurisdictions where shareholders have a central role in corporate
governance, disclosure may facilitate more effective corporate
governance and reduce agency costs.87
For investors, mandatory disclosure provides these benefits
more efficiently and fairly than relying on investor self-help, since
companies can more readily obtain and report the same information
publicly to all investors than investors and analysts can on their
own.88 In the absence of mandatory disclosure, corporate managers
also have incentives to under-report, particularly with respect to
risks or negative information. 89 Mandatory disclosure also offers
benefits to reporting companies. Specifically, they face the same
disclosure demands as their competitors, and they are less
vulnerable to unpredictable and potentially costly investor demands
for information.90
84
See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (IOSCO),
OBJECTIVES
AND
PRINCIPLES
OF
SECURITIES
REGULATION
3
(2017),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD561.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U75H-AG4U].
85 See, e.g., Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 17
CFR Parts 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240 & 249 [Release No. 33-10064; 34–77599; File
No. S7-06-16], 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,919 (concept release Apr. 22, 2016) [hereinafter
Regulation S-K Concept Release] (“[l]owering information asymmetries between
managers of companies and investors may enhance capital formation and the
allocative efficiency of the capital markets…[D]isclosure…may lead to more
accurate share prices, discourage fraud, heighten monitoring of the managers of
companies, and increase liquidity.”).
86 See id. (noting the role of mandatory disclosure in capital formation).
87 See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 336–38 (1979) (highlighting how
reducing agency costs protects investors); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky,
The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 718–19 (2006) (arguing
that “narrowing disclosure duties would in fact hamper the ability of information
traders to minimize total management agency costs.”).
88
See Park, Targeted Social Transparency, supra note 20, at 94 (noting that
without mandatory disclosure, market participants often cannot obtain information
on social concerns).
89 See Langevoort, supra note 72, at 975–85 (discussing the incentives for and
prevalence of misleading under-disclosure regarding risk).
90
See Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure, supra note 13, at 454–55
(discussing the costs to companies of private ordering).
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Nonetheless, all jurisdictions acknowledge that the goal is not to
achieve full disclosure—however that may be defined—but rather
an optimal level of disclosure that balances the costs to issuers of
obtaining, reporting, and auditing information.
Disclosure
obligations are therefore limited to “material” or “significant”
information, as those concepts are defined in each jurisdiction. 91
Although reporting rules may prescribe specific disclosures,
companies are often free—even under mandatory reporting
statutes—to make their own materiality judgments, and different
approaches to “mandatory” disclosure may offer companies greater
discretion regarding specific disclosures. 92 For example, some
jurisdictions rely heavily on prescriptive, line-item disclosure while
others rely more on reporting principles or guidance.
By ensuring that the capital markets have access to reliable
information about the financial impacts of certain market-wide ESG
risks, such as climate change, mandatory disclosure may also reduce
the degree to which global capital markets are exposed to high
volatility when large-scale risk events materialize.93 Concerns about
this kind of systemic risk are among the reasons why the G20’s
Financial Stability Board has encouraged more financial-sector firms
and other public companies to measure and disclose material
climate-related risk in their annual reports.94 However, improving
transparency around these financial risks may require companies to
report not only on the financial effects of ESG risks that are material
to them, but also on the external impacts of their operations on their
stakeholders. Some of this information may not be material to the
firm itself but may contribute to financial risk on a systemic basis,

91
In the United States, for example, information is defined as material for
purposes of securities regulation if there is “a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote” or
“that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information” available to
the investor. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (quoted
and applied by Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988)).
92
In the United States, material information not expressly required to be
reported under the federal securities laws must only be disclosed if it is “necessary
to make [a] required statement, in light of the circumstances … not misleading.” 17
C.F.R. § 230.408; 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20.
93
TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at iii, 1.
94 Id.
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perhaps due to aggregated or networked effects across whole
segments of the market.95
2.1.2. Rationales and Goals of Voluntary Disclosure
While mandatory disclosure focuses primarily on the
informational needs of investors and the markets as a whole,
voluntary ESG disclosure frameworks have developed to promote
somewhat different goals either as a form of private regulation of
corporate behavior, or as a tool to enforce other private governance
regimes, namely, corporations’ “voluntary” commitments to
responsible business conduct. In both cases, the goal of disclosure
is to encourage companies to reduce the negative impacts of their
operations on corporate stakeholders. As a result, companies define
materiality in terms of stakeholder concerns under these private
non-financial reporting frameworks rather than in terms of financial
risk and return.
Indeed, the rise of sustainability reporting has been based on
widespread recognition that disclosure is in fact “information
disclosure regulation” 96 and governments themselves often use
disclosure as an alternative to traditional command-and-control
public regulation.97 Sustainability reporting is intended to motivate
companies to change practices that cannot hold up under greater
transparency. It also facilitates external oversight of corporations
from consumers, NGOs, and other stakeholders. 98 Although
disclosure is often less effective than direct regulation,99 this is due
95 See Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 510 (2015)
(noting that “firm-by-firm disclosures [fail to] fully depict the complexity and
interconnectedness of many of today’s investment instruments and corporations”).
96
Reinhard Steurer, Disentangling Governance: A Synoptic View of Regulation by
Government, Business and Civil Society, 46 POL’Y SCIENCES 387, 401 (2013).
97
See California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, CAL. CIVIL. CODE
§1714.43 (2010) (mandating disclosure to encourage companies to monitor
suppliers’ conduct).
98
Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private Environmental
Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. LAW 1, 39 (2015); see also Park, Targeted Social
Transparency, supra note 20, at 95–96 (describing the disclosure feedback loop).
99 See generally Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599 (2013) (noting that regulators tend to prefer imposing new
disclosure rules rather than dealing with the core issues through direct regulation).
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to the flexibility it provides companies—typically, the form of the
information and the process by which it is disclosed are mandated,
but specific conduct is not, leaving firms substantial discretion in
determining how to respond.100
In addition to voluntary ESG disclosure frameworks, separate
corporate non-financial reporting requirements have emerged in
support of private governance regimes that promote CSR and
address the governance gaps created by the expansion of business
activity beyond the jurisdiction of national governments.101 Private
governance is widely recognized as an alternative to traditional
government regulation and self-regulation by individual firms.102 It
typically includes codes of conduct, policies, and practices adopted
by industry-wide organizations or groups of firms. 103 The most
prevalent forms of private governance are principles-based,
certification, reporting, and process standards that seek to reduce
corporations’ environmental, social, or human rights impacts and
draw heavily on international treaties and business conduct
norms.104
In private governance regimes, industry associations, NGOs,
and other non-state actors are responsible for developing standards
and enforcing them vis-à-vis their members. 105 Disclosure is a
100
See Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance Into
Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 319–20 (2017) (defining marketcontingent business regulation).
101 See Dirk Ulrich Gilbert, Andreas Rasche, & Sandra Waddock, Accountability
in a Global Economy: The Emergence of International Accountability Standards, 21 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 23, 24, 28–29 (2011) (addressing “[m]echanisms that attempt to fill the
omnipresent governance voids that the rise of the global economy has created”).
102 See VOGEL, supra note 33, at 9 (“Civil regulation represents an effort to fill
the governance gap between the law and the market.”).
103
Steurer, supra note 96, at 395–96.
104 See generally Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, supra note 101, at 25–30. See also
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129,
148–56 (2013). See also Oren Perez, Private Environmental Governance as Ensemble
Regulation: A Critical Exploration of Sustainability Indexes and the New Ensemble
Politics, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 543, 550 (2011) (describing different types of
industry-based environmental private governance standards). For example, ISO
14001 environmental management systems are based on a private governance
standard that establishes a set of procedures and organizational practices to assist
a firm in achieving its environmental goals.
105
See Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Green Clubs and Voluntary
Governance: ISO 14001 and Firms’ Regulatory Compliance, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235, 235
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critical enforcement tool that enables other companies and external
stakeholders to identify shirkers and ensures that participating firms
satisfy the standards they have voluntarily adopted as a member or
signatory of the regime.106 For example, companies that sign on to
the United Nations Global Compact must produce an annual
“communication on progress” to explain their efforts to comply with
the Global Compact’s ten principles of responsible business
practice. 107 In general, firms voluntarily adhere to these private
standards due to a combination of civil society pressure from NGOs,
market pressure, strategic self-interest, and social norms. 108
Compliance is also enhanced by other private actors through
external third-party assessment,109 or by the threat of expulsion from
the private governance regime for non-compliance.110 All of these
private governance mechanisms also depend on information about
corporations’ business practice, which has fueled the rise of
voluntary ESG disclosure and private disclosure frameworks.
The fact that sustainability reporting and non-financial reporting
standards have evolved as a soft form of private regulation is not
widely appreciated by opponents of ESG disclosure reforms.
Although critics of regulatory solutions often prefer shareholder
engagement, voluntary sustainability reporting, and private
reporting standards as market-driven approaches to ESG

(2005) (examining the creation of private standards by “governance clubs” of
industry associations). Civil society organizations also promulgate these private
standards. See also Steurer, supra note 96, at 395–96 (referencing standards
developed by Amnesty International and Ceres).
106
See Potoski & Prakash, supra note 105, 26–29 (identifying disclosure as one
of three “swords” voluntary regulatory regimes adopt to preserve the regime’s
stringency and reputation).
107
See UN GLOBAL COMPACT, THE COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS IN BRIEF,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participation/report/cop
[https://perma.cc/BJ4D-NQST].
108
David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261,
268–69 (2008).
109
See generally Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New
Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 337–46 (2008)
(describing the growing importance of such assessments).
110 See Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. &
ADMIN. L. 291, 314 (2014) [hereinafter McAllister, Harnessing] (noting the revocation
power of voluntary labeling and certification regimes).
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disclosure, 111 private non-financial reporting regimes were in fact
designed to advance regulatory goals that extend far beyond those
of most governments’ frameworks for financial reporting.
2.2. Modes of Interaction Between Public Regulation and Private
Ordering in ESG Disclosure
As the case studies in Section 3 illustrate, many governments are
introducing new measures to improve how companies disclose
material ESG information to investors. At the same time, public
debate about the appropriate scope, mode, and purpose of ESG
disclosure reflects continued concern about corporate accountability
given the growing disjuncture between the scale of business activity
and the ability of governments to regulate it.112 The proliferation of
private ESG disclosure frameworks reflects ongoing efforts by nonstate actors to fill both of these gaps.113
Some governments look to ESG disclosure to advance both
investor and market-oriented disclosure reform, and greater
corporate accountability. For these regulators, the dichotomy
between public disclosure regulation and private non-financial
reporting frameworks, while useful for analytical purposes, belies
reality. The regulatory literature confirms that private regimes, like
the emerging private disclosure standards, work best when backed

See Shearman & Sterling LLP, Concept Release on Business and Financial
Disclosure
Required
by
Regulation
S-K
(Aug.
31,
2016),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-367.pdf
[https://perma.cc/44TH-YGYW].
112
See Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo & Dorotheé Baumann, Global
Rules and Private Actors: Toward A New Role of The Transnational Corporation in Global
Governance, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 505, 512 (2006) (“[E]conomic actors undermine the
internal sovereignty of nation states, namely the state’s ability to independently set
rules and limit or regulate domestic private activities within its jurisdiction”). See
also Stephen Kim Park & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, A Firm-Driven Approach to Global
Governance and Sustainability, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 259–66 (2015) (noting the
structural shortcomings of state-based environmental regulation to address climate
change).
113
See Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, supra note 101, at 24 (referring to
“Mechanisms that attempt to fill the omnipresent governance voids that the rise of
the global economy has created . . . because of an increasing imbalance in global
rulemaking”).

111
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by intelligent regulation, 114 and that many governments have
adopted non-coercive regulatory approaches that are functionally
similar to private governance regimes like those that govern
voluntary ESG disclosure.115
Even for governments that focus primarily or exclusively on the
core investor protection, market efficiency, and stability goals of
securities regulation, public regulators can engage with existing
private governance regimes in numerous ways,116 and when they do
so, retain varying levels of authority and control.117 Accordingly, in
order to identify the legal and policy options available to the SEC and
other regulators, it is essential to analyze the ways in which public
regulation of corporate reporting may interact with private ordering.
To that end, we present a typology that distinguishes five types of
interactive and iterative relationships between public and private
regulation and other forms of private ordering: deference, support,
partnership, delegation, mandating, and displacement.
The following figure defines these modes and provides an
example of each mode in an applicable reporting context.

114 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 551 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Role] (declaring that “There is no such
thing as a purely private or purely public realm”). See also VOGEL, supra note 33, at
170 (arguing that “The effectiveness of much civil regulation depends on a strong
and well-functioning public sphere”).
115
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., NUMEROUS FEDERAL ACTIVITIES
COMPLEMENT U.S. BUSINESS’S GLOBAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY EFFORTS
(Aug.
2005),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05744.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TL3F-TLZQ] (describing CSR initiatives of the U.S.
government).
116 See McAllister, Harnessing, supra note 110, at 317 (describing harnessing as
“how public legislators and regulators can intentionally construct regulatory
frameworks that rely upon and incorporate private regulation.”)
117
See Tim Bartley, Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules:
Intersections of Public and Private Standards, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 517, 523 (2011)
(“Rather than viewing private regulation as either transcendent or technical, a more
promising route involves paying attention to its substantive interactions with
domestic law, regulation, and other rules.”).
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Figure 1. Modes of Public-Private Interaction
Deference

Support

Partnership

Delegation

Mandating

Displacement

Public
regulator
mandates
minimum
standards or
incorporates
private
standards

Public
regulation
seeks to
displace or
supplant
private
standards

EU conflict
minerals
reporting
integration
of OECD
guidelines

Statutory or
regulatory
preemption
of private
standards or
prohibition
on
shareholder
activism

Definition
Public
regulation
does not
directly
engage
with
private
standards

Public
regulator
endorses
or
facilitates
private
standards

Public
regulator
partners
with private
actors on
private
standards

Public
regulator
grants
authority to
private
organization
to regulate
Example

U.S.
federal
securities
regulation

Stock
exchange
ESG
disclosure
guidance

Public
regulators’
engagement
with GRI

International
Financial
Reporting
Standards
(IFRS)

It is important to note, at the outset, that these modes constitute
stylized ideal types. For example, nearly all mandatory disclosure
regimes for public companies require disclosure of corporate
governance matters and material risks, and these rules can elicit
some form of non-financial reporting. Likewise, private ordering is
ubiquitous and cannot be fully displaced by regulation, even if
doing so would be desirable. Conceptualizing public-private
interaction as ideal types enables an analysis of the discretionary
power and overlap that exists in practice.
Governments may also simultaneously engage through multiple
modes with respect to a given issue, such as non-financial reporting.
For example, a regulator may simultaneously (i) endorse or facilitate
ESG disclosure standards, 118 (ii) mandate when reporting is
118
See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International
Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration
Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 521–23, 544–45 (2009) (defining directive and
facilitative forms of state orchestration).
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required with respect to specific ESG information, (iii) partner with
a private standard-setting organization to develop ESG disclosure
rules, and (iv) delegate responsibility for assurance of ESG
disclosure to private third-party providers. Within each mode of
interaction are also many potential regulatory strategies.
These modes of interaction are distinguishable in part by their
regulatory strength. Public regulators employ different degrees of
governmental power in their interactions with private standardsetting organizations and the firms that adopt them. The extent to
which regulators expend government resources on command-andcontrol rulemaking, garnering political support, providing financial
incentives, and convening interested parties reflects the willingness
and ability of regulators to use their unique powers to influence how
well private disclosure regimes work.119
Consistent with Jody Freeman’s conception of governance, we
posit that the interaction between public regulators and private
disclosure regimes is the result of negotiated relationships that are
dynamic, nonhierarchical, and decentralized. 120 The relationship
between public-private interaction and regulatory strength is also
inherently bilateral and dynamic. 121 This is because regulatory
reform can stimulate changes in private standard setting, and
voluntary ESG disclosure standards can also iteratively inform later
regulatory reforms.
The following figure shows the spectrum of regulatory strength
reflected by each mode of interaction.

119
See JETTE STEEN KNUDSEN & JEREMY MOON, VISIBLE HANDS: GOVERNMENT
REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS RESPONSIBILITY 47–49 (2017). See also IAN
AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 101–32 (1992) (presenting a model of enforced selfregulation).
120
See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 114, at 571–74.
121 See Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38
J. L. & SOC’Y 20, 45 (2011) (noting that the relationship between public regulation
and private standards may depend on the identity of private participants, the
instruments adopted, and the objectives of the relevant regulatory regimes).
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Figure 2. Spectrum of Regulatory Strength
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2.2.1. Deference
At the end of the spectrum representing the weakest use of state
power, governments may passively or actively defer to private
ordering. Some governments may do so passively, simply by not
acknowledging or engaging with non-financial reporting issues or
with private reporting standards. However, public regulators may
also actively defer to market participants and private ordering by
employing conscious strategies that advance specific policy goals.
For example, financial regulators may choose to forego engaging with
ESG private reporting regimes based on a view that the needs and
actors served by financial reporting or public regulation are distinct
from those served by private standards.122 This position is evident in
the United States where private ESG disclosure is the predominant

122 See Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann, & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory
Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and
the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 480 (2011) (defining regulatory
diversification).
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source of non-financial information in the United States, due to the
SEC’s general deference to private ordering.123
In contrast, the following four modes of interaction—support,
partnership, delegation, and mandating—exhibit various forms of
engagement between public regulation and private governance with
respect to non-financial reporting. Employing regulatory strategies
under these modes enables governments to align or engage with
voluntary reporting frameworks and other private governance
regimes.
2.2.2. Support
Moving further along the regulatory strength spectrum,
governments interested in promoting non-financial reporting may
also employ measures short of regulation to support non-financial
reporting instead of directly mandating it, steering existing private
governance regimes in a desired direction or encouraging the
development of regulatory frameworks based on public-private
collaboration. 124 Because government regulators are involved,
however, their interactions with private governance regimes and
firms are in the “shadow of hierarchy” that is defined by legal rules
and legal institutions and so the state retains the power to exercise its
authority.125
2.2.2.1. Endorsement
One way government can support corporate non-financial
reporting practices is by endorsing private ESG disclosure

See infra Section 3.2.1.
See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004)
(characterizing New Governance as “a more participatory and collaborative model,
in which government, industry, and society share responsibility for achieving
policy goals.”); Abbott & Snidal, supra note 118, at 507–09 (contrasting New
Governance-based regulation with traditional governmental regulation).
125
See Steurer, supra note 96, at 399 (describing, in general terms, public
regulation “in the shadow of hierarchy”).
123
124
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standards. 126 Endorsement effectively legitimizes specific private
reporting regimes that meet pre-specified requirements.127 Public
regulators may also disseminate information about certain reporting
regimes, or use labels and logos to signal their support for specific
private standards, giving them the explicit backing of the state.128
Endorsement may also be institutionalized in regulatory guidance,
such as through the selection and publication of industry best
practices129 or the selection of a private ESG disclosure standard as
a template or model. 130 As discussed below, governments most
strongly endorse private standards by delegating their regulatory
standard-setting authority to private reporting regimes.131
The SEC has endorsed third-party standards in the past. For
example, in the context of its specialized disclosure requirements for
conflict minerals under Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC
requires an issuer to use a “nationally or internationally recognized
due diligence framework” in exercising due diligence on the source
and chain of custody of its conflict minerals, 132 and in its 2012
rulemaking, the SEC expressly recognized the OECD’s due
diligence guidance as the sole framework to meet this criterion.133
126
See Tom Fox et al., Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Baseline Study 6 (World Bank, Working Paper, Oct. 1, 2002),
https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/284431468340215496/pdf/346550
CSR1CSR1interior.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4AN-8Q8E].
127
See Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Dynamic Governance Interactions: Evolutionary
Effects of State Responses to Non-State Certification Programs, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE
74, 76 (2014) (noting how governments can also limit the authority of a private
governance regime by supporting the creation of competing standards).
128
KNUDSEN & MOON, supra note 119, at 64–65.
129 See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 302 (2006) (arguing
that the cultivation of best practices by public regulators constitutes a form of
administrative rulemaking).
130
See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1302 (1999) (proposing that
the SEC adopt Ceres’ reporting format for mandatory social disclosure under the
Exchange Act).
131 See infra notes 142–147 and accompanying text.
132
Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,324 (Sept. 12, 2012).
133
See id. at 56, 281 (“Presently, it appears that the only nationally or
internationally recognized due diligence framework available is the due diligence
guidance approved by the [OECD].”). See also OECD Due Diligence Guidance for
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (3d
ed. 2016), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/OECD-Due-Diligence-GuidanceMinerals-Edition3.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2EC-ZND5].
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2.2.2.2. Facilitation
Public regulators can also directly facilitate the adoption and use
of private ESG disclosure standards by market participants.134 Most
notably, governments can assist private reporting regimes by
providing them financial or administrative support.135 This may be
undertaken by bringing to bear the state’s unique resources, such as
providing tax relief or exemptions for companies that use private
reporting regimes.136 Regulators can also enhance the capacity of
private governance regimes through benchmarks and guidelines.137
2.2.3. Partnership
Beyond supporting voluntary ESG disclosure, public regulators
may choose to partner with private actors, for example, to jointly
develop rules or incorporate private standards into law or
regulations.138 Public regulators may initiate or convene this kind of
collaboration, or may engage with private governance regimes as a
co-equal participant.139 Particularly at the global level, governments
routinely participate in ad hoc networks and non-hierarchical
governance arrangements with companies, NGOs, and other state
and non-state actors.140 These practices may even be institutionalized
as a form of deliberative, experimental learning.141 For example, as
the case studies in Section 3 illustrate, many governments are
working to harmonize their reporting standards with the GRI

See Fox et al., supra note 126, at 5.
See Gulbrandsen, supra note 127, at 77 (conceptualizing the contributions of
governments to private certification programs).
136
KNUDSEN & MOON, supra note 119, at 65–66.
137
Fox et al., supra note 126, at 4–5.
138
See Martijn W. Scheltema, Assessing Effectiveness of International Private
Regulation in the CSR Arena, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 272–73 (2014).
139 See KNUDSEN & MOON, supra note 119, at 67.
140
Grainne de Búrca, Robert O. Keohane & Charles Sabel, New Modes of
Pluralist Global Governance, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 723, 733–38 (2013).
141 See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271, 305–09 (2008).
134
135

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

284

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:2

Standards, which the vast majority of the largest firms are already
familiar with.
2.2.4. Delegation
In addition, public regulators may choose to delegate regulatory
functions, such as standard-setting, oversight, or enforcement, to
private disclosure regimes. Governments can formally permit
private standards to regulate a given area autonomously, or allow
them to do so subject to review and oversight either directly by a
regulator or indirectly through a private self-regulatory
organization (SRO).142 Public regulation may serve as a default or
fallback option if a private governance regime fails to meet a legallyestablished minimum threshold.143
With respect to financial reporting, for example, the SEC
delegates regulatory authority over accounting rules to the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), a private organization which
is responsible for establishing Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). Similarly, other governments have delegated
authority to a private international body, the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), to harmonize global
accounting standards through the production and dissemination of
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).144
Encouraging or requiring the use of third-party auditors and
assurance providers is also a delegation of regulatory monitoring
authority to private third-party actors. 145 For example, in
142
See Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in
Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 884, 884 (2009) (referring to the SEC’s
adoption of SRO-established standards). The criteria or conditions on such
delegation are a form of meta-regulation, which represents a regulatory mandate,
see infra notes 154–156 and accompanying text.
143
See David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Legal
Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 549
(2007) (referring to default hybridity).
144
See TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 60–98 (2011) (describing the
emergence of the IASB).
145
The use of private auditors and assurance providers may also constitute a
form of partnership—rather than delegation—depending on the operational
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implementing the requirements of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act on management evaluation of internal financial controls, the
SEC required companies to base this evaluation on a third-party
framework that met certain criteria.146 Similarly, both U.S. and EU
conflict mineral disclosure rules require that reporting companies
use independent third-party auditors—again a form of delegation.147
Finally, granting private rights of action to shareholders or other
third parties to enforce disclosure requirements or anti-fraud rules
is another common form of delegation.
2.2.5. Mandating
Toward the stronger end of the regulatory strength spectrum,
public regulators can of course adopt new mandatory disclosure
standards within existing regulatory reporting frameworks.148 Yet
even within traditional rulemaking or legislation, public regulators
may use their authority to incorporate private standards into public
law; in such cases, mandating also endorses or facilitates private
governance. 149 Public regulators may expressly reference existing
private ESG disclosure standards in their rulemaking or support the
development of private standards that are later incorporated by
reference.150 For example, the SEC referenced the internal control
framework created by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
autonomy of the private third parties and the nature of their relationships with
governments. See Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third Party Verification, 53 B.C.
L. REV. 1, 12 (2012) [hereinafter McAllister, Third Party Verification] (characterizing
third-party verification as public-private partnership).
146
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Final Rule, Management’s Report on Internal
Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act
Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,639–41 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270 & 274).
147
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i) (2010) (requiring companies to hire an
independent, private auditor to confirm the chain of custody of certain minerals);
Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/821, art. 12 2017 O.J. (L 130) 1, 3 (EU)
(“Third-party auditing of an economic operator’s supply chain due diligence
practices ensures credibility for the benefit of downstream economic operators…”).
148
Fox et al., supra note 126, at 3.
149
McAllister, Harnessing, supra note 110, at 319.
150
Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control over Access to Public Law: The Perplexing
Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 750 (2014).
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of the Treadway Commission (COSO) in its rules implementing
Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and also expressly
harmonized the SEC’s rules with COSO’s framework.151 Another
example of incorporation by reference in ESG disclosure are conflict
minerals regulations in the U.S. and the EU, which comprehensively
embed the OECD’s due diligence guidance in their rules. 152 In
addition, a government regulator may effectively incorporate a
private ESG disclosure standard by granting it mutual recognition
vis-à-vis corresponding public regulatory requirements.153
Another form of mandating is the use of “meta-regulation,” that
is, when governments regulate the private regulators rather than
setting the standards themselves, in order to enforce minimum
standards. 154 For example, a public regulator may require that a
private reporting regime meet certain requirements before it can be
used by market participants. 155 When adopting meta-regulation,
like traditional regulation, the regulator exercises a higher level of
regulatory strength than in the prior modes of interaction, but metaregulation nonetheless provides autonomy and flexibility to private
governance regimes. In contrast to traditional command-and151 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Final Rule, Management’s Report on Internal
Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act
Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636, 36,639–41 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270 & 274); COSO, INTERNAL CONTROL-INTEGRATED
FRAMEWORK (1992).
152 See Parliament and Council Regulation 2017/821, art. 12 2017 O.J. (L 130)
1, 3 (EU) (setting up a European Union system for supply chain due diligence selfcertification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and
gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas); European Commission,
The EU’s new Conflict Minerals Regulation: A quick guide if you’re involved in the trade
in tin, tungsten, tantalum or gold 5 (Mar. 2017) (identifying the articles of the EU
conflict minerals regulation that correspond to each of the five steps of the OECD’s
due diligence guidance).
153 See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition
Regimes: Governance without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 279
(2005). Mutual recognition permits regulators to recognize another jurisdiction’s
standards as an adequate substitute. Stephen Kim Park, Guarding the Guardians: The
Case for Regulating State-Owned Financial Entities in Global Finance, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
739, 785 (2014). Traditionally, mutual recognition has been applied to other statebased regulators. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International
Finance, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 56 (2011).
154 See generally CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELFREGULATION AND DEMOCRACY 245–91 (2002).
155
See De Búrca & Scott, supra note 19, at 7 (referencing baseline hybridity).
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control regulation, mandating minimum criteria for private
reporting standards enables a private standard-setting organization
to choose whether to comply with the minimum standard. Metaregulation can also deliberately incorporate flexible and open-ended
criteria. 156 For example, this may entail requiring private ESG
regimes to articulate the objectives and scope of their reporting
frameworks to their users, instead of mandating that they include
certain reporting criteria.
2.2.6. Displacement
At the far end of the regulatory strength spectrum, governments
may theoretically refuse to collaborate with private governance
regimes or may reject them altogether.157 If this is the case, when a
private standard becomes a viable alternative to public regulation,
the government could seek to displace it158 or may choose to directly
compete with privately developed rules and standards.159
In the context of non-financial reporting, the SEC and other
public regulators could compete with private disclosure regimes, for
example, by establishing mandatory reporting rules under national
securities laws or stock exchange listing rules that do not align with,
but would supersede, existing private standards for most of the
largest firms.160 Although we are not aware of such a case, public
regulation could also theoretically preempt private governance, for
example, by requiring companies to report all material ESG

See KNUDSEN & MOON, supra note 119, at 68.
Tim Bartley, Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of
Public and Private Standards, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 517, 524–25 (2011).
158
See Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational Business Governance Interactions:
Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 11–12 (2014)
(describing various types of interaction between the standards developed by the
government and by private actors including competition and cooptation).
159 See Scheltema, supra note 138, at 273 (observing that competition may occur
between standards set by private actors and those set by the government).
160 See Margaret Ryznar & Karen E. Woody, A Framework on Mandating Versus
Incentivizing Corporate Social Responsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1667, 1673–74 (2015)
(discussing disclosure requirements mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank Acts).
156
157
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information only in the annual report and not in a free-standing
sustainability report.161
3.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT APPROACHES TO
ESG DISCLOSURE

Governments seeking to respond to growing demand for nonfinancial information must consider the modes of public-private
interaction outlined in Section 2 because any reforms will be
adopted against a backdrop of existing private standards and
enforcement mechanisms. The inevitable result is a transition from
deference to existing ESG disclosure regimes and other forms of
private ordering, to a hybrid model where public regulation and
private governance intersect. To understand what this might look
like in practice, we examine the experience of countries that have
followed this path across different capital markets.
This comparative analysis applies the theories of public-private
interaction discussed in Section 2 to different jurisdictional contexts
in order to identify regulatory approaches to non-financial
reporting. The following discussion begins by describing this
Article’s comparative methodology and then proceeds by applying
it to the United States and six other leading jurisdictions. For the
SEC and other regulators considering whether to undertake nonfinancial reporting reform in the future, our analysis offers a rich
source of insight into the specific forms hybrid public-private nonfinancial reporting systems can take and how to optimize private
ordering within existing public disclosure regimes.
3.1. Methodology
We start from the premise that the optimal modes of publicprivate interaction will likely differ across jurisdictions. 162 As
161 See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 114, at 575 (noting reasons why certain
functions should remain exclusively under state authority).
162 See Dan Wielsch, Global Law’s Toolbox: Private Regulation by Standards, 60
AM. J. COMP. L. 1075, 1077 (2012) (“[P]rivate normative orders face diverging
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Section 2 shows, the interaction of public regulation and private
governance is a dynamic process, in part driven by the policy
objectives, administrative capacity, and legal constraints of the
public regulator.163 Further, government strategies are shaped by
competitive market pressures, such as support for (or opposition to)
government intervention by market participants.164 Although we
cannot examine in this Article all of the critical factors that have
influenced these policy choices and may affect their success, we
identify how each jurisdiction approaches ESG disclosure from the
standpoint of investors.
The scope of our comparative analysis is the United States, along
with South Africa, Brazil, the European Union, the United Kingdom,
Hong Kong, and mainland China. Because the United States has yet
to adopt non-financial reporting requirements for reporting
companies, it represents a jurisdiction where public regulation most
closely reflects deference to private ordering. We therefore begin
our comparative analysis by introducing the U.S. approach to ESG
disclosure. The remaining jurisdictions reflect two criteria. First,
they constitute the largest capital markets in the world or in their
respective regions (e.g., South Africa, Brazil, the European Union,
the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and mainland China) outside the
United States. As Appendix I shows, they also reflect a diversity of
legal systems. In addition, certain countries—such as South Africa,
Brazil, and the United Kingdom—have been early movers in ESG
disclosure. Accordingly, these case studies provide insights on how
public regulation of non-financial reporting by market leaders has
taken account of private ordering.

conditions for recognition in different states. As a consequence, the success of states
in the law market depends on how responsive a particular state law is to instances
of private regulation.”).
163 Gulbrandsen, supra note 127, at 86.
164 See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 133–34
(2012). See also Nikolay A. Dentchev, Elvira Haezendonck & Mitchell van Balen,
The Role of Governments in the Business and Society Debate, 56 BUS. & SOC’Y 527, 530
(2017) (arguing that “researchers need to . . . focus on the specific mechanisms
related to the role of governments . . . within the institutional country setting”).
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3.2. Case Studies
The case studies below are presented in order of the degree of
regulatory strength the jurisdiction’s approach to ESG disclosure
reflects—that is, from the most deferential or market-based to the
most state-dominated. In each, we identify the modes of publicprivate interaction from Section 2 that shape the jurisdiction’s
approach to non-financial reporting. Specifically, we analyze how
ESG disclosure is addressed under each jurisdiction’s laws and how
public regulation in each jurisdiction interacts with private ESG
disclosure frameworks. These discussions incorporate aspects of the
institutional context and political economy that may affect modes of
public-private interaction, which we summarize in Appendix I. To
identify the regulatory strength of private disclosure regimes, we
identify whether ESG disclosure regulation is mandatory,
voluntary, or applies on a comply-or-explain basis. 165 These
elements are summarized in Appendix II. We also identify other
ESG disclosure policies or incentives that regulators have
introduced and what modes of interaction they represent.
3.2.1. United States
Among the jurisdictions included here, the United States best
represents a model where public regulation (i.e., U.S. federal
disclosure rules) largely defers to private ordering or private
regulation with respect to standard-setting, assurance, and
enforcement of ESG disclosure. The current U.S. approach to nonfinancial reporting is a bifurcated disclosure system: private
ordering in the form of third-party reporting standards, voluntary
disclosure, and shareholder activism drives stakeholder-oriented
sustainability reporting, while corporate annual reports and proxy
165
Comply-or-explain corporate governance or sustainability measures allow
companies to comply by either attesting that they have adopted the stated practice
or by explaining why they have not. See FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (FRC), WHAT
CONSTITUTES AN EXPLANATION UNDER ‘COMPLY OR EXPLAIN’? REPORT OF DISCUSSIONS
BETWEEN
COMPANIES
AND
INVESTORS
5
(Feb.
2012),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/a39aa822-ae3c-4ddf-b869db8f2ffe1b61/what-constitutes-an-explanation-under-comply-or-exlpain.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P3A7-BSG5].
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statements remain subject to the reporting rules established under
federal securities laws. State corporate governance rules give
directors and officers significant discretion to consider stakeholder
interests, 166 but given the strong influence of the shareholder
primacy norm among business and legal professionals and the
preference of many U.S. companies and their advisors for private
ordering over regulatory intervention, non-financial reporting
reform faces resistance, and views on the materiality of ESG factors
to investors are still evolving.167 Past efforts to use disclosure as a
regulatory tool have also faced strong opposition and legal
challenge. 168 Given these limits, U.S. non-financial reporting
practice continues to defer heavily to private ordering and private
regulation, with limited facilitation and endorsement of voluntary
reporting and private ESG disclosure initiatives.
To be sure, the general rules that govern corporate reporting in
the United States already require disclosure of material nonfinancial information. 169 While the scope of such disclosure is
subject to companies’ own assessments of ESG materiality, some
companies provide sustainability—or climate-risk—disclosure in
their annual reports. 170 In addition, the SEC has adopted
“specialized disclosures” regulations that cover the use of conflict

166 See generally Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005) (observing the wide legal bounds for profit-sacrificing
decisionmaking); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 29–31 (2012)
(discussing how business judgment rule deference permits deviation from
shareholder primacy).
167
Comments from companies and business groups on the SEC’s 2016
Regulation S-K Concept Release reflect mixed views on ESG materiality but strong
opposition to disclosure reforms. See generally Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure
Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG Reporting Reform From the Regulation S-K
Concept Release, 65 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (empirically analyzing public
comments to the SEC on ESG materiality and other aspects of risk disclosure).
168
See Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure, supra note 13, at 471–73
(discussing examples).
169
See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate
Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, & 241)
[hereinafter SEC Climate Release], https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/339106.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKW3-G6RA] (explaining how current disclosure
rules extend to material information on climate-related risks).
170 See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also SASB, supra note 70
(reviewing the quality of these disclosures).
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minerals in supply chains, 171 certain business activities in Iran, 172
and, for firms in the extractive sector, mine safety.173 Federal proxy
rules also mandate certain disclosures regarding risk management,
executive compensation, and board diversity that may also relate to
ESG factors and risks.174
However, the SEC has not yet indicated a willingness to consider
any significant reforms of federal disclosure rules to address nonfinancial matters. 175 Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Exchange Act of 1934 authorize the SEC to require disclosure when
“necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.”176 However, these statements of the SEC’s statutory
171 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 1502–1504, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–22 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(2012)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection Act]; 17 C.F.R. § 229.104
(2012) (prescribing mine safety disclosure); see also Conflict Minerals, supra note 132.
In January 2017, the SEC announced its intention to re-evaluate Section 1502. See
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ACTING CHAIRMAN MICHAEL S. PIWOWAR, PUB. STATEMENT,
RECONSIDERATION OF CONFLICT MINERALS RULE IMPLEMENTATION (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/reconsideration-of-conflict-mineralsrule-implementation.html [https://perma.cc/49B6-TCD5].
172
See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112–158, § 219, 126 Stat. 1214, 1235–36 (ITRA). For a detailed examination of ITRA
and a comparison to conflict minerals disclosure regulation, see Park, Targeted Social
Transparency, supra note 20, at 108–13.
173
See Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection Act, supra note 171; 17 C.F.R. §
229.104 (mine safety); see also Mine Safety Disclosure, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,762 (2011).
The SEC’s final rule, Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-78167 (Sept. 26, 2016), was repealed Feb. 14, 2017 by
H.J. Res. 41, 115th Cong. (2017).
174
See Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure, supra note 13, at 426–28
(summarizing these rules).
175
In August 2019, the SEC took an initial step toward expanding
employment-related (i.e., “social”) disclosures by proposing to add “human
capital” disclosures under Item 101 of Regulation S–K, which would be subject to
companies’ own materiality judgment. Modernization of Regulation S–K Items
101, 103, & 105, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,358, 44,369–72 (Aug. 23, 2019) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 229, 239, & 240).
176
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a)(1) (2018); see also id. § 77s(a);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(b), 78l, 78m(a), 78n(a), 78o(d),
78w(a) (2018). Accordingly, leading securities law experts have argued that the
SEC’s authority extends to rulemaking in the public interest and that “publicness”
is a defining feature of securities law. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B.
Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101
GEO. L.J. 337, 375–82 (2013) (discussing how federal securities law is grounded in
understandings of the “publicness” of listed companies); Hillary A. Sale, Public
Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1017–31 (2013) (same).
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mission also link these two elements, requiring that in adopting any
disclosure reform to advance the public interest, the SEC must also
consider investor protection and “whether the action will promote
efficiency, competition[,] and capital formation.” 177 Under this
interpretation, the goals of disclosure under the federal securities
laws are not necessarily aligned with the clear regulatory goals of
disclosure under most sustainability reporting frameworks and
other private regulatory regimes.
By declining to adopt new rulemaking or guidance on nonfinancial reporting, the SEC has deferred to private reporting
standards and other forms of private ordering, which are central to
U.S. non-financial reporting practice, as well as to corporate
management’s judgment of ESG materiality. As noted in Section 1,
voluntary sustainability reporting is common among the largest U.S.
public companies, and these reports are often based on frameworks
and standards developed by the GRI, the CDP, or the SASB. 178
Under these frameworks, third-party assurance, which is another
form of private ordering, is optional.
Similarly, the SEC has chosen to defer to ESG-related
shareholder proposals and other forms of direct engagement
between investors and companies to drive changes in corporate
disclosure practice.
In 2019, consistent with past trends,
environmental and social proposals accounted for around half of all
voted proposals. 179 Some of these proposals generate ESG
disclosure by asking the company to produce a report or provide
specific ESG information. 180 However, shareholder proposals are
177
Regulation S–K Concept Release, supra note 85, at 23,917 n.6, 23,921–22
(citing Section 3(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2018),
and Section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2018)).
178
IRRC, supra note 24, at 31–33.
179
ERNST & YOUNG, FIVE TAKEAWAYS FROM THE 2019 PROXY SEASON 7 (July 23,
2019),
https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/eycom/en_us/topics/cbm/ey-cbm-2019-proxy-season-preview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SV63-ADMA] (noting that average support for voted proposals
has risen to 28 percent on average, and that approximately 40 percent of all
environmental and social proposals are withdrawn prior to voting, often reflecting
a successful shareholder engagement); see also THE CONFERENCE BOARD, PROXY
VOTING ANALYTICS (2015–2018) 14–15 (2018) [hereinafter CONFERENCE BOARD],
https://law.rutgers.edu/sites/law/files/RR-1674-18-R.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EL9C-EZD3].
180
Thirteen such proposals were filed in 2018. CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note
179, at 231.
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non-binding, making shareholder engagement a poor tool for
standardizing disclosure practices across all firms.
Although the SEC has not yet introduced a comprehensive ESG
disclosure framework, it has taken steps to facilitate non-financial
reporting, and indirectly, the use of private reporting frameworks.
The most obvious example is its 2010 guidance on the materiality of
climate-change-related risks, which highlighted where current
reporting rules should already elicit such information.181 The SEC
also indirectly facilitates ESG-related shareholder proposals
through its no-action review process; by interpreting the relevant
rules in a way that permits proposals to go to a vote, the SEC has
allowed shareholders to raise the profile of ESG issues and to
encourage non-financial reporting.182
Other federal agencies have also played a modest facilitating
role by removing perceived barriers to the use of ESG information
in investment analysis and shareholder engagement. Most notably,
the Department of Labor’s current guidance for certain pension
funds clarifies that ESG factors may be financially material to fund
beneficiaries and therefore can be properly incorporated in fund
management. 183 While not expressly endorsing any particular
private standard, individual SEC commissioners have also
periodically endorsed non-financial reporting and ESG concepts
generally, and in 2016, the SEC raised the profile of non-financial
reporting by seeking public comment on the need for changes to
See SEC Climate Release, supra note 169.
With limited exceptions, these proposals generally do not garner majority
support. See CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 179, at 14, 90 (listing the limited
number of environmental and social issues that have gained majority support).
183
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in
Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,135, 65,135-136
(Oct. 26, 2015); cf. Principles for Responsible Investment & MSCI Inc., Global Guide
to
Responsible
Investment
Regulation
14–15
(2016),
https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/0/PRI_MSCI_Global-Guide-toResponsible-Investment-Regulation.pdf/ac76bbbd-1e0a-416e-9e83-9416910a4a4b
[https://perma.cc/ZK9Q-JTAG] (noting that the European Commission’s
Occupational Retirement Provision Directive and the domestic laws of Sweden,
Norway, and Germany mandate ESG integration into risk management processes
or investment decisions). But see EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO. 2018-01 (Apr. 23, 2018) (cautioning plan
fiduciaries to “not too readily treat ESG factors as economically relevant” to
investing and to carefully consider the potential costs of engagement with portfolio
firms on ESG matters).
181
182
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Regulation S-K to better elicit non-financial information.184 It also
sought input on the private standards that could usefully inform
future disclosure rulemaking.185
Stock exchanges in the United States have played a limited role
in promoting ESG disclosure among listed firms, in contrast to the
leading role of stock exchanges in other jurisdictions. However, the
Nasdaq OMX and the NYSE are both members of the Worldwide
Federation of Exchanges and participate in the United Nations
Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative (SSEI). Through their
membership, these stock exchanges visibly endorse the work of the
SSEI and indicate their support for its missions to advance ESG
disclosure for listed firms, even though no U.S. exchange has yet
adopted ESG disclosure policies or guidance.186
In sum, the dominant mode of public-private interaction in the
United States is deference to private ordering. Private ordering
takes many forms beyond a strong reliance on voluntary corporate
reporting within and beyond public filings. These range from the
creation of reporting standards and frameworks, to shareholder
engagement and other forms of activism, to reliance on third party
assurance providers and, to a lesser extent, to shareholder litigation
to promote disclosure accuracy and reliability.
3.2.2. South Africa
South Africa represents a model of non-financial reporting that
predominantly relies on private regulation but nonetheless contrasts
with the U.S’s deference to various forms of private ordering. ESG
disclosure in South Africa revolves around the King Code on
Corporate Governance, initially created in 1994.187 The King Code
is now in its fourth iteration as “King IV,” which went into effect in
See Regulation S-K Concept Release, supra note 85.
Id. at 23,973.
186
Sustainable Stock Exchs. Initiative, LIST OF PARTNER EXCHANGES,
https://www.sseinitiative.org/sse-partner-exchanges/list-of-partner-exchanges/
[https://perma.cc/QD2V-J9G4] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
187
Inst. of Dirs. Of Southern Africa, King Report on Corporate Governance for
South Africa (1994). See also ROBERT ECCLES & MICHAEL KRZUS, THE INTEGRATED
REPORTING MOVEMENT: MEANING, MOMENTUM, MOTIVES, AND MATERIALITY 5–6
(describing the origins and creation of the King Code).
184
185
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2017. 188 The King Code was created and has been revised by a
committee convened by the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa
(IoDSA), which is primarily composed of private and independent
members.189 The IoDSA, a professional body of board directors, is
the custodian of the King IV reports.190 From its outset, the King
Code has been based on voluntary principles and leading practices,
rather than rules. 191 It is expressly intended to complement and
augment statutorily created hard law as part of a hybrid system of
corporate governance.192
One of the foundations of the King Code is transparency,193 and
compliance is achieved through its disclosure regime. 194 King IV
expressly addresses the use of disclosed information by
stakeholders.195 Its disclosure regime is based on two organizing
principles: integrated reporting and “apply-and-explain.”
Under the IIRC’s International <IR> Framework, integrated
reporting seeks to integrate ESG disclosure with financial

188
Inst. of Dirs. in Southern Africa, King IV: Report on Corporate Governance for
South Africa, 2016 38 (Nov. 1, 2016) [hereinafter King IV Report],
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/collection/684B68A7-B768465C-8214-E3A007F15A5A/IoDSA_King_IV_Report_-_WebVersion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Z69-F79G] (“King IV is effective in respect of the financial
years starting on or after 1 April 2017”).
189
See id. at 119–20 (describing the process and participants in the
development process of King IV).
190
Inst. of Dirs. in Southern Africa, King IV: Questions and Answers,
https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/collection/16F4503D86F9-43D5-AEB4C067B06EB59C/Guide_to_questions_and_answers_on_King_IV.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CX4Z-U7C6] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
191 See Ruth Jebe, Sustainability Reporting and New Governance: South Africa
Marks the Path to Improved Corporate Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 233,
266 (2015).
192
King IV Report, supra note 188, at 35.
193
See id. at 22 (“encourage transparent and meaningful reporting to
stakeholders”).
194
Michael van Rensburg & Ashlin Perumall, JSE Listings Requirements
Amended to Align with King IV, BAKER MCKENZIE (June 19, 2017),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e63c908b-31d2-4c81-b1ea138b942a474a [https://perma.cc/R89Y-VCLM].
195
King IV Report, supra note 188, at 48 (providing that “[t]he governing body
[of the organization] should ensure that reports issued by the organisation enable
stakeholders to make informed assessments of the organisation’s performance, and
its short, medium and long-term prospects”).
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information. 196 King III, the predecessor to the current King IV,
established integrated reporting in South Africa and served as a
foundation for the development of the International <IR>
Framework.197 King IV expressly adopts the “triple context”198 and
the “six capitals” model 199 as organizing concepts for ESG
disclosure. The organization’s governing body (e.g., a corporation’s
board of directors) has the discretion to determine where King IVcompliant disclosures are made, either in an integrated report or a
“distinguishable, prominent and accessible part of another report,”
such as a sustainability report or social and ethics committee
report.200 Disclosures may be posted on the organization’s website,
on other platforms, or through other media.201
King IV is based on “apply-and-explain,” an evolution of King
III’s modified version of comply-or-explain. 202 Under King IV’s
apply-and-explain model, an organization must implement the King
Code and also explain how its 17 principles have been implemented
and how such measures achieve the principles’ contemplated
outcomes.203 South Africa is the first country to implement applyand-explain as an organizing principle for its non-financial
reporting regime.

196
Adam Sulkowski & Sandra Waddock, Beyond Sustainability Reporting:
Integrated Reporting is Practiced, Required and More Would be Better, 10 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 1060, 1064 (2013); see also Integrated Reporting SA, FAQ: The Octopus Model,
https://integratedreportingsa.org/faq-the-octopus-model/
[https://perma.cc/37NX-MSJ9] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (describing the
integrated report as the “head of the octopus…connected to a multitude of arms,
each of which is a detailed report/information source: for instance, the financial
statements, sustainability report, governance report, social and ethics committee
report, risk report, remuneration report, or other printed or online information”).
197 See ROBERT ECCLES & MICHAEL KRZUS, supra note 187, at 8–10 (describing
King III and the Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa’s Discussion
Paper).
198
King IV Report, supra note 188, at 24 (referring to the “combined context of
the economy, society, and environment in which the organisation operates”).
199
See King IV Report, supra note 188, at 24 (referring to “financial,
manufactured, intellectual, human, social and relationship, and natural capitals”).
200 King IV Report, supra note 188, at 28, 48.
201 King IV Report, supra note 188, at 48.
202 King IV Report, supra note 188, at 37. See also ROBERT ECCLES & MICHAEL
KRZUS, supra note 187, at 8.
203 See King IV Report, supra note 188, at 37.
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The soft legal authority of King IV is supplemented by the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).
The JSE requires
implementation of the King Code as a condition for listing.204 The
JSE is the world’s 19th largest stock exchange by market
capitalization and the largest in Africa. 205 Referencing the King
Code in the JSE listing requirements has the effect of making the
King Code mandatory for all JSE-listed companies. 206 The JSE, a
privately-owned entity, operates as an SRO supervised by the South
African Financial Services Board (FSB).207 The FSB, which regulates
and supervises the non-bank part of the South African financial
services industry, is subject to the general authority of the Ministry
of Finance.208
In sum, the dominant mode of public-private interaction in
South Africa is support. Indirect facilitation of private ordering is
evident in two inter-related domains, the creation of the King Code
by IoDSA and its enforcement by the JSE. Delegation is also evident
insofar as the South African government enables the JSE to regulate
non-financial reporting through its listing requirements absent an
express regulatory mandate.

204 See JSE Limited Listings Requirements, para. 8.63(a) [hereinafter JSE Limited
Listings
Requirement],
https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSERulesPoliciesandRegulationItems/JSE%20List
ings%20Requirements.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BAV-KWYW] (last visited Sept. 27,
2019); see also ROBERT ECCLES & MICHAEL KRZUS, supra note 187, at 3 (noting the
central role of the JSE and contrasting it to mandatory regulation by a securities
regulator).
205
JSE Overview, Who We Are, https://www.jse.co.za/about/historycompany-overview [https://perma.cc/E9ES-TLNZ] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
206 Id. See also JSE Limited Listings Requirements, supra note 204, at para. 3.84
(“The effect of incorporating certain practices from the King Code in the Listings
Requirements is to make their implementation mandatory, this is notwithstanding
the fact that application of the corporate governance practices in the King Code is
generally voluntary”).
207
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOUTH AFRICA, IOSCO PRINCIPLES—
SECURITIES MARKETS: DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION 5 (Oct. 2010),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10355.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QP5J-5D5U].
208 Id.
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3.2.3. Brazil
Non-financial reporting in Brazil is primarily governed by
private ordering through B3, the country’s largest stock exchange.209
As a stock exchange, B3 operates as an SRO on the basis of authority
granted to it by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil
(Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, or “CVM”). 210 B3 is a publiclytraded corporation owned by institutional investors and is itself
listed on the New Market (Novo Mercado) segment of B3.211 B3’s own
annual sustainability report is produced in accordance with the GRI
Standards.212
B3 established non-financial reporting on a voluntary “reportor-explain” basis for listed companies in 2011.213 Listed companies
were encouraged to disclose whether they published a stand-alone
209
B3 is the successor to the BM&FBOVESPA and previously, the Sao Paolo
Stock Exchange. Gilson, Hansmann, & Pargendler, supra note 122, at 485. In its
current form, B3 was established in 2017 with the merger of BM&FBOVESPA and
CETIP. The following discussion refers to B3 in relation to the BM&FBOVESPA
prior to 2017. See B3, GUIDE FOR NONRESIDENT INVESTORS 3 [hereinafter B3 Guide],
https://www.b3.com.br/data/files/F9/56/04/8D/932106108326F006790D8AA8
/GUIA-INR-B3.pdf [https://perma.cc/QS9W-LR46] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
210
The Brazilian securities markets are primarily regulated by the CVM,
which in turn is supervised by the National Monetary Council. B3 Guide, supra
note 209, at 11. See also Securities Act, Law No. 6.385/76 (Br.) (Dec. 7, 1976),
https://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/subportal_ingles/menu/investors/
anexos/Law-6.385-ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K96-9A8G]. B3 is subject to direct
oversight by the CVM. Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative, B3,
https://sseinitiative.org/data/b3/ [https://perma.cc/RZ25-8ZMX] (last visited
Sept. 27, 2019).
211
Sustainable
Stock
Exchanges
Initiative,
B3,
https://sseinitiative.org/data/b3/ [https://perma.cc/RZ25-8ZMX] (last visited
Sept.
27,
2019);
see
also
B3,
Ownership
Structure,
https://ir.bmfbovespa.com.br/static/enu/estrutura-acionaria.asp?idioma=enu
[https://perma.cc/Z9SJ-5WU9] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
212
B3,
NEW
VALUE—CORPORATE
SUSTAINABILITY
12
(2016),
https://www.b3.com.br/data/files/96/D0/37/3C/0F07751035EA4575790D8AA
8/GuiaNovoValor_SustentabilidadeNasEmpresas_EN.PDF
[https://perma.cc/TLN9-GQ68].
213 See BM&FBOVESPA, External Communication, Proposal to adopt “Report
or Explain” sustainability reporting model for listed companies (Dec. 11, 2011)
[hereinafter
BM&FBOVESPA
2011
External
Communication],
http://www.b3.com.br/data/files/9F/12/E6/65/62121510FE0C840592D828A8/
EC-017-2011-Proposta-de-adocao-ao-modelo-Relate-ou-Explique-EN-US.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NL2F-T4VN].
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sustainability report or an integrated report, and indicate where the
report was available, or alternatively, explain why they did not
publish a report.214 From the beginning, B3’s disclosure regime was
integrated into mandatory reporting requirements through the
CVM’s Reference Form, which the CVM provides to issuers as a
template for mandatory periodic reporting.215 The purpose of this
integration was to reduce operational costs on companies associated
with the report or explain disclosure regime.216 The CVM facilitated
the establishment of this voluntary initiative by adding a new
category to its reporting system for sustainability reporting.217
Since 2017, B3’s ESG disclosure regime has focused on whether
listed companies take into account the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) in their sustainability reporting.218 This
shift was prompted by the CVM’s decision to amend its Reference
Form to expressly require disclosure on issuers’ ESG disclosure
policies and practices. 219 The coordination between B3 and the
CVM, and the integration of their respective reporting regimes,
suggest that the CVM’s delegation of authority to B3, with respect
to non-financial reporting, is a deliberate and coordinated policy
decision to support non-financial reporting in Brazil.
Public-private interaction is also evident in the coordination and
assistance of private ESG disclosure regimes with B3. B3’s
214
B3, Communication to Stakeholders, (Feb. 2018), at 12,
https://www.b3.com.br/data/files/5A/D7/71/18/BE1E161010983D16790D8AA
8/Communication_to_Stakeholders_B3%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YWGSPRH].
215
CVM,
Instruction
No.
480
(Dec.
7
2009),
https://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/subportal_ingles/menu/investors/
anexos/CVMInstruction480.pdf [https://perma.cc/DAF4-JUS3]. This disclosure
was made in the Reference Form under a residual category (Item. 7.8—Description
of the company’s relevant long-term relationships not elsewhere described). See
BM&FBOVESPA 2011 External Communication, supra note 213; CVM, Instruction
No. 480, supra note 215, art. 22 and annex 24.
216 See B3 Guide, supra note 209, at 12.
217
See BM&FBOVESPA 2011 External Communication, supra note 213.
218
B3, External Communication, Proposal for Listed Companies to “Report or
Explain for the Sustainable Development Goals” (Apr. 12, 2017) [hereinafter B3 2017
External
Communication],
http://www.b3.com.br/data/files/7C/D3/22/0B/200FC51097FB2DC5790D8AA
8/CE-013-2017-DP-Relate-Explique-ODS_ingles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EYX6SRHU].
219 Id.
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disclosure regime was developed in partnership with the GRI and
the IIRC.220 Further, B3 has partnered with the GRI to offer training
to listed companies on ESG disclosure practices.221 Along the same
lines, B3 has partnered with the CVM, the GRI, and the Global
Compact to develop guidance on SDGs-related disclosure in the
Reference Form.222
B3’s strategy with respect to non-financial reporting is consistent
with its membership in UN-affiliated ESG fora such as the Global
Compact, the PRI, and the SSEI. 223 As much as their operational
value, B3’s partnerships with the GRI and the IIRC serve as signals
to foreign investors about Brazil’s commitment to ESG.224
In sum, the dominant modes of public-private interaction in
Brazil are support and partnership. The establishment of Brazil’s
stock exchange-based non-financial reporting framework was
facilitated by legal and operational measures implemented by the
CVM, which also constituted an implicit endorsement. In addition,
the inter-relationships between B3, the CVM, and global private ESG
disclosure regimes (specifically the GRI and the IIRC) exhibit
elements of partnership as shown by their collaboration on the
establishment, implementation, and modification of B3’s disclosure
regime.

BM&FBOVESPA 2011 External Communication, supra note 213.
See BM&FBOVESPA 2011 External Communication, supra note 213 (“To
assist companies not familiar with sustainability reporting, the Exchange will hold
training workshops in partnership with Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) in early
2012.”); B3 2017 External Communication, supra note 218 (“As in the first version of
‘Report or Explain,’ Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) will partner with us and will
interact with companies (through training workshops, for example) to assist them
in the process of understanding the SDGs and putting them into practice.”).
222
B3, B3, CVM, GRI and Global Compact Launch Document to Facilitate
Disclosure
of
Socio-environmental
Information
(Dec.
7,
2018),
http://www.b3.com.br/en_us/news/socio-environmental-information.htm
[https://perma.cc/72WE-CKU5].
223 See B3, NEW VALUE – CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 212, at 12.
224
See CFA INSTITUTE & PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, ESG
INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAS: MARKETS, PRACTICES, AND DATA 26–27 (2018),
https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/survey/esg-integration-inthe-americas.ashx [https://perma.cc/5VVX-WB5M] (noting that demand for ESG
information and integration in Brazil is primarily from foreign investors).
220
221
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3.2.4. European Union
The European Union (EU) has adopted one of the most
prominent mandatory non-financial reporting regimes in force
today, but at the same time one that directly defers to private
regulation and supports its further development. At its core is the
EU’s 2014 Non-Financial Reporting Directive (the “EU Directive”),
which requires the disclosure of non-financial information by
certain large firms defined as “public interest entities” (PIEs).225 Its
explicit dual purpose is first, to harmonize non-financial reporting
practice across the EU and second, to advance public policies in
favor of corporate accountability, responsible business practice, and
sustainable economic development.226
In contrast to the U.S.’s shareholder-centric approach, the EU
uses disclosure to improve corporate governance and change
business practice in matters like diversity and human rights,227 and
defines materiality in terms of both investors and other
stakeholders.228 The EU Directive builds on priorities set by the EU
in 2003 to encourage greater corporate accountability for
environmental and social impacts by improving transparency, as
well as the EU’s view that the role of business includes both
225
Council Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 22 October 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 330), amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards
disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings
and groups [hereinafter EU Directive]. PIEs are entities that individually or as a
corporate group on a consolidated basis have on average more than 500 employees
during the fiscal year. Id. at arts. 1(1) & 1(3). The EU Directive permits Member
States to expand the scope of companies who are subject to the EU Directive’s
reporting requirements. Id. at preamble par. 14, art. 1(d) (exempting small and
medium-sized enterprises).
226
Id. at preamble paras. 3 & 6.
See also European Commission,
Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on Non-Financial Reporting
(2017/C 215/01), 5 July, 2017, at 5, 7, 13 [hereinafter NFR Guidelines] (stressing the
need for disclosure to support sustainable finance and the national implementation
of the Guiding Principles, the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris
Climate Accord).
227 See EU Directive, supra note 225, at preamble, para. 18 (stating its purpose
to “put indirect pressure on (companies) to have diversified boards”).
228 See EU Directive, supra note 225, at para. 4. Such materiality assessments
should include the external “impact of [corporate] activities” on third parties, not
just material non-financial risks to the firm itself. See also NFR Guidelines, supra
note 226, at 5–6 (disclosure of materiality assessment processes is optional).
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generating profits for shareholders and producing “shared value”
for society.229
The EU Directive offers an excellent example of the dynamic,
iterative relationship between private and public regulation. First,
the EU Directive was itself influenced by a wide range of prior
public-private initiatives—most notably, the IIRC’s work on an
integrated approach to financial and non-financial reporting.230 In
addition, the comply-or-explain approach to disclosure was
pioneered in the United Kingdom, and Danish non-financial
reporting rules also influenced the project.231 Further, the goals of
the EU Directive are well-aligned with the regulatory goals of most
private reporting regimes.
The EU Directive requires that a PIE provide a non-financial
statement in its management report that includes information on the
entity’s environmental, social and employee-related matters, respect
for human rights, anti-bribery matters, and diversity. 232 The
statement must also include a description of the entity’s policies in
each of these areas, the due diligence processes it has implemented
to mitigate adverse corporate impacts, and a statement of the
outcome of these policies.233 In addition, the non-financial statement
should include a discussion of the principal risks linked to the

229 See EU Directive, supra note 225, at preamble para. 2 (citing European
Commission, “A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social
Responsibility,” adopted Oct. 25, 2011). See EU Parliament CSR Report, supra note
47, at paras. 2, 5, & 23 (noting that CSR must be embedded within companies’
business, financial, and operational strategies). The concept of “shared value” as a
goal for both for-profit and nonprofit entities was first introduced by management
scholars Michael Porter and Mark Kramer. See generally Michael E. Porter & Mark
R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, 89 HARV. BUS. REV. 62 (2011).
230
See NFR Guidelines, supra note 226, at 3–4 (noting the Commission’s
review of these standards). See also EU Parliament CSR Report, supra note 47
(discussing the need to promote the IIRC framework).
231 See Stefan Muller et al., Stakeholder Expectations on CSR Management and
Current Regulatory Developments in Europe and Germany, 12 CORP. OWNERSHIP &
CONTROL 505–06 (2015).
232
See EU Directive, supra note 225, at arts. 1(1), 1(3) (adding new arts. 19(a)(1)
and 29(a)(1)).
233 See EU Directive, supra note 225, at arts. 19(a)(1)(b)–(c), 29(a)(1)(b)–(c).
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company’s business activity, responses necessary to mitigate those
risks, and relevant key performance indicators (KPIs).234
EU member states were required to adopt implementing
legislation at the national level by the end of 2016, 235 and the EU
Directive allows member states to exceed the minimum standards it
establishes. 236 The particular legal authorities responsible for
regulation and implementation also vary by jurisdiction. In order to
improve the comparability of reporting across firms and within
sectors, the EU has issued non-binding reporting guidelines to
promote greater uniformity across member states with respect to
particular non-financial performance indicators.237
Despite its mandatory nature, the EU Directive strongly
supports and defers to existing private standards for non-financial
reporting. As the official guidance for the EU Directive itself
observes, the EU Directive “gives companies significant flexibility to
disclose relevant information in the way that they consider most
useful.”238 In fact, the EU Directive may require no change in some
companies’ non-financial reporting practice since it allows member
states to exempt from any new reporting requirements those entities
who already prepare a separate report on the basis of existing
national, regional, or international frameworks that satisfy the EU
Directive’s requirements.239 Part of its flexibility also comes from the
principles-based nature of the EU Directive itself, which requires

234 See EU Directive, supra note 225, at arts. 19(a)(1)(d)–(e), 29(a)(1)(d)–(e).
Entities should also disclose the principal risks of their “business relationships,
products, or services” that are “likely to cause adverse impacts” where “relevant
and proportionate.” Id. at arts. 19(a)(1)(d), 29(a)(1)(d).
235 See EU Directive, supra note 225, at art. 4. See generally GRI & CSR EUROPE,
MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 2014/95/EU
(2017),
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/NFRpublication%20online_ve
rsion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5R2L-S3U4]
(discussing progress
towards
implementation).
236
See EU Directive, supra note 225, arts. 1(1)(6), 1(3)(6). For example, member
states can require companies to obtain third-party assurance of non-financial
statements even though the EU Directive only requires an auditor to certify that the
non-financial statement has been made. See id. art. 19(a)(5).
237
See generally NFR Guidelines, supra note 226.
238
See NFR Guidelines, supra note 226, at 2.
239
See EU Directive, supra note 225, at preamble para. 9, arts. 1(1), 1(3)
(adopting art. 19(a)(4)). Entities relying on such frameworks must disclose on
which frameworks they rely. See id. arts. 1(1), 1(3).
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only that the required disclosures are to be made on a comply-orexplain basis.
Finally, the EU Directive does not require third-party assurance,
gives companies freedom to largely determine what to disclose, and
allows member states to permit firms to publicize the non-financial
statement on their website rather than with the entity’s management
report.240 The trade-off for this flexibility is that the EU Directive
cannot effectively promote standardization and comparability of
non-financial information.
The EU Directive and its guidance also offer clear examples of
support for private ordering as they reference over twenty of the
internationally recognized private reporting standards that were
consulted during the drafting process, including the CDP Standards,
the GRI, SASB, and ISO 26000. 241 The EU Directive explicitly
endorses these national and international reporting frameworks, as
well as a number of multilateral public-private standards, including
the EMAS, the Global Compact, the Guiding Principles, and the
OECD Guidelines. 242 The European Commission’s High Level
Expert Group (HLEG) on Sustainable Finance has also specifically
endorsed the work of the TCFD by urging the integration of the
TCFD voluntary disclosure recommendations into EU policy.243
Beyond the modes of public-private interaction highlighted
above, the adoption of the EU Directive has also facilitated the
emergence of new ESG disclosure initiatives and guidance from the
private sector. For example, in 2017, Nasdaq issued an ESG
Reporting Guide for issuers in the Nordic and Baltic markets that
provides specific ESG performance indicators and specifically
references the EU Directive, the UN’s Sustainable Development
240

19(a)(6)).

See EU Directive, supra note 225, at preamble para. 16, art. 1 (adopting art.

241
See NFR Guidelines, supra note 226, at 3–4 (noting the Commission’s
review of these standards).
242 See, e.g., NFR Guidelines, supra note 226, at 11; EU Directive, supra note 225,
at para. 11 (urging companies, governments and stakeholders to reference existing
frameworks).
243
See NFR Guidelines, supra note 226, at 6–7, 13. The TCFD framework itself
also endorses many of the same voluntary private frameworks. See generally TASK
FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, IMPLEMENTING THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES
(2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/FINAL-TCFDAnnex-Amended-121517.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YX6-J32F].
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Goals, and the TCFD’s climate reporting framework.244 Stimulating
new reporting initiatives by companies and private organizations in
this way is an explicit goal of the EU Directive.245
In sum, the dominant modes of public-private interaction in the
European Union are deference and support.
Although
implementation by particular member states varies, the 2014 NonFinancial Reporting Directive largely defers to existing private
standard setters and voluntary disclosure practices. The EU has also
endorsed and facilitated the development of private standards and
reporting guidance.
3.2.5. United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (U.K.) is a global leader in the promotion
of non-financial reporting and has over the past decade developed
an increasingly mandatory approach. These efforts are led by the
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), a private organization that is
responsible for audit and accounting oversight, and for establishing
corporate governance and investor stewardship standards.
ESG disclosure is required under the U.K.’s Corporate
Governance Code,246 and under the listing rules of the U.K. Listing
Authority.247 Even though the U.K. is generally seen as a strongly
shareholder-centric jurisdiction, its non-financial reporting
regulation builds on earlier corporate governance reforms that
promoted greater corporate accountability for stakeholder impacts.
This transition to what has been called an “enlightened shareholder
value” model came in 2006, when Section 172 of the Companies Act
redefined director fiduciary duties to shareholders to include
244
See NASDAQ, ESG REPORTING GUIDE: A SUPPORT PROGRAM FOR NASDAQ
ISSUERS—FOCUS
AREA:
NORDIC
&
BALTIC
MARKETS
(2017),
https://business.nasdaq.com/esg-guide/ [https://perma.cc/ELD4-M2X2].
245
See NFR Guidelines, supra note 226, at 14.
246
See generally FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (FRC), THE U.K. CORPORATE GOV.
CODE (July 2018), https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-484195b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF
[https://perma.cc/G9W4-6QA2].
247
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the U.K.’s securities regulator,
also regulates listing requirements in the U.K. through the U.K. Listing Authority,
but each exchange may also adopt its own listing rules. See also LONDON STOCK
EXCHANGE GROUP, supra note 34.
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consideration of corporate stakeholders and the long-term interests
of the company.248
Before the adoption of the 2006 Companies Act, ESG disclosure
was largely voluntary and based on companies’ own reporting
frameworks or those developed by third-party standard setters.
Like the other jurisdictions surveyed in this Article, many of the
U.K.’s current approaches to non-financial reporting also build on
private and public-private ESG initiatives such as the Guiding
Principles.249 Many U.K. companies not subject to ESG disclosure
rules also produce voluntary sustainability reports or have begun to
integrate ESG disclosure into their annual reports.250
Since 2006, ESG disclosure in some form has been mandated for
companies formed or listed in the U.K. under various overlapping
regimes. Listed or “quoted” companies are required under the
Companies Act 2006 to report certain environmental issues in their
directors’ reports. 251 Regulations introduced in 2013 under the
Companies Act require further that quoted companies disclose
greenhouse gas emissions and report on human rights issues, as well
as director, management, and employee gender diversity in a
strategic report on a comply-or-explain basis. 252 Although the
248
See generally ANDREW KEAY, THE ENLIGHTENED SHAREHOLDER VALUE
PRINCIPLE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2013) (discussing the corporate
governance reforms that led to the “enlightened shareholder value” model).
249
See generally U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra
note 60.
250
See Environmental, Social and Governance (“ESG”): New UK Mandatory
Reporting
Rules,
MAYER
BROWN
(Sept.
2013),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/123b4ac7-a050-46f2-94490b6740327749/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/57d4f570-4b22-4a0b-83761e639889272e/UK_Mandatory_Reporting_Sep13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3BBPJ8SP] (discussing the new 2013 SR Regulations).
251 See UKLA Technical Note: Risk Factors, FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY (July
2013),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/other/tn-621.2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9LMP-SDAE] (discussing the Prospectus Directive (PD) and
noting the risks associated with the prospectus summary requirement).
252
Under the Companies Act, narrative reporting must be provided in a
Strategic Report and a Directors’ Report. See The Companies Act 2006 (Strategic
Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013, No. 1970, Part 15, ch. 4A
(concerning strategic reports) & Part 15, ch. 5 (concerning directors’ reports) (UK),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents
[https://perma.cc/Y4A3-C2AD]. See also EXPOSURE DRAFT: GUIDANCE ON THE
STRATEGIC
REPORT,
FIN.
REPORTING
COUNCIL
(Aug.
2013),
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Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) can enforce violations of the
Corporate Governance Code, the adequacy of these disclosures is
enforced primarily through private ordering via shareholder
engagement rather than by administrative enforcement. 253
Nonetheless, all of these reforms mean that the U.K. reflects a high
degree of regulatory strength with respect to non-financial
reporting.
The U.K. was also among the first EU member states to
implement the EU Directive,254 and the U.K.’s regulations are among
the more stringent. The U.K. regulations require both quoted
companies and large companies to report their principal risks,
business risks and non-financial KPIs in the company’s strategic
report, in addition to a diversity statement. 255 Going beyond the
EU’s baseline, the U.K. requires these ESG disclosures to be audited
for consistency and provides that directors may be fined for
Notwithstanding the
violations of these requirements. 256
mandatory force of these rules, the U.K. regulations also support
and endorse the use of “national, EU-based and international
reporting framework[s]” so long as the reporting company discloses

https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e17e5074-7139-4453-a1763ca1fd229f51/;.aspx [https://perma.cc/2CMC-H7G9]; ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTING
GUIDELINES: INCLUDING STREAMLINED ENERGY AND CARBON REPORTING GUIDANCE,
DEFRA
(June
2013),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/791529/Env-reporting-guidance_inc_SECR_31March.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4EWZ-25X7].
Listed companies’ annual reports include
financial statements and the strategic report, directors’ report, corporate
governance statement, and directors’ remuneration report. See MARC MOORE &
MARTIN PETRIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW, REGULATION, AND THEORY 199
(2017) (discussing the U.K.’s disclosure framework).
253
See MOORE & PETRIN, supra note 252, at 62–64 (discussing enforcement
mechanisms).
254
See
The
Companies
Act
2006
(U.K.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/contents.
See
generally
discussion supra Section 3.2.4 (analyzing the EU Non-Financial Reporting
Directive).
255
See Companies Act 2006, supra note 252, at art. 3 (amending the Companies
Act 2006).
256
See GRI & CSR EUROPE, MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE
2014/95/EU
(2017),
at
30,
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/NFRpublication%20online_ve
rsion.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYF7-RC2S].
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which it has adopted. 257 These revisions took effect in 2016 as a
further amendment to the content of the strategic report under the
Companies Act 2006.
In sum, the dominant modes of public-private interaction in the
United Kingdom are deference and support. The comply-or-explain
principles that ground its corporate governance regime also
represent a hybrid public-private approach. Similarly, the FRC’s
role in developing standards for companies and investors represents
a form of delegation. The U.K.’s implementation of the EU NonFinancial Reporting Directive, however, represents a more
mandatory approach to disclosure, while still continuing to defer to
private disclosure frameworks.
3.2.6. Hong Kong
Hong Kong is another jurisdiction that illustrates multiple
modes of public-private interaction in the context of ESG disclosure.
Like many of the other jurisdictions surveyed here, Hong Kong has
transitioned to a mandatory non-financial reporting regime, but one
whose content reflects strong deference and delegation to private
regulation. 258 However, in contrast to the United States, Hong
Kong’s non-financial reporting framework engages broadly with
existing private standards for ESG disclosure. Like the EU and the
U.K., Hong Kong’s “mandatory” ESG standards are in fact a “soft
mandate,” offering a high degree of flexibility while deferring to
management judgment and voluntary disclosure standards. Hong
257
See The Companies, Partnerships and Groups (Accounts and Non-financial
Reporting) Regulations 2016, Companies Partnership 2016 No. 1245, 414CB(6) (UK),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/1245/made/data.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8NDZ-6RDC].
258 See HONG KONG STOCK EXCH., ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE
(ESG) REPORTING GUIDE (Jan. 2016) para. 6 & 11(1) [hereinafter HKEX ESG GUIDE],
https://en-rules.hkex.com.hk/node/3841
[https://perma.cc/5TAK-MH9R]
(defining materiality in terms of stakeholders for environmental and social
reporting purposes). The HKEx ESG Guide is incorporated in App. 27 of the Main
Board Listing Rules and App. 20 of the GEM listing rules. See also HONG KONG
STOCK EXCH., ESG REPORTING GUIDE AND FAQS (last updated on May 17, 2019),
https://www.hkex.com.hk/Listing/Rules-and-Guidance/OtherResources/Listed-Issuers/Environmental-Social-and-Governance/ESGReporting-Guide-and-FAQs?sc_lang=en [https://perma.cc/EJ3W-HEVY].
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Kong’s adoption of non-financial reporting rules for listed
companies aligns with trends in global capital markets and supports
its efforts to develop a reputation as a “green finance” hub.259
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s (HKEx) core listing standards
largely defer to issuers’ own judgments regarding ESG materiality.
For example, issuers must provide a “discussion and analysis of the
[company’s] performance and the material factors underlying its
results and financial position,” a requirement that could include
material ESG risks or impacts.260 The listing rules also encourage
public companies to provide additional information voluntarily in
their annual reports, such as “a discussion of the listed issuer’s
policies and performance on community, social, ethical and
reputational issues.”261 All companies incorporated in Hong Kong
are also subject to certain non-financial reporting obligations under
the Hong Kong Companies Act that are incorporated into the HKEx
listing rules. 262 These measures are enforced by the HKEx, with
ultimate oversight by the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC).
The HKEx non-financial reporting requirements, while
mandatory, rest largely on private ordering. In 2015, the HKEx
amended voluntary ESG disclosure guidance it had adopted in 2011
in order to make certain environmental and social disclosures
mandatory for all listed companies on a comply-or-explain basis.263
The HKEx’s ESG Guide requires companies to adopt specific
environmental and social policies or to provide “considered
259 See HONG KONG SEC. & FUT. COMM’N, STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR GREEN
FINANCE
(Sept.
2018),
https://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/green-finance.html
[https://perma.cc/DU9E-QMED] (establishing environmental disclosure as a core
element of its framework).
260
This discussion “should emphasize trends and identify significant events
or transactions” during the reporting period. See Main Board Listing Rules—App.
16,
A16–32,
https://enrules.hkex.com.hk/sites/default/files/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/f/a/FAQs_
mb_appx16.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2VH-D56Q].
261 Id.
262
See Hong Kong Companies’ Ordinance (2014), § 390(a)-(d) (stipulating the
content of the Director’s Report); HKEx Main Board Listing Rules, App. 16–28
(incorporating these requirements).
263
See HKEX ESG GUIDE, supra note 258, at para. 7 (superseding HONG KONG
STOCK EXCH., CONSULTATION PAPER ON ESG REPORTING GUIDE (Dec. 2011).
Specifically, these standards require all listed companies to include in either their
annual report or in a free-standing ESG report a statement that they have complied
with the ESG Guide for the fiscal year or an explanation of why they have not).
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reasons” for any deviation. It also includes additional KPIs that
companies may elect to provide on a voluntary basis.264
Although the HKEx’s ESG Guide does not explicitly reference or
require listed companies to adopt any particular private ESG
disclosure standard, it defers further to private reporting standards
by allowing listed companies who already produce voluntary
sustainability reports to continue to do so, so long as the private
reporting standards are consistent with the HKEx’s standards and
the company explains any deviations from the policies or indicators
in the HKEx’s ESG Guide. Indirectly setting minimum standards
for these private regimes is in essence a form of meta-regulation.
However, the HKEx also gives a high degree of deference to issuers
regarding where and what to report, the particular entities covered
by the report, how materiality is defined, and whether to obtain
third-party assurance for reports.
The HKEx also directly supports private international standards
by endorsing them and facilitating their use. 265 For example, the
HKEx’s ESG Guide and related information for issuers directly
reference the GRI’s ESG disclosure standards, as well as other
international reporting standards, and encourage issuers to use
them.266 The HKEx has also partnered with the GRI to prepare a
“linkage guide” for listed companies to help them use the GRI
Standards to comply with the HKEx’s ESG Guide.267
In sum, the dominant modes of public-private interaction in
Hong Kong are support coupled with a flexible comply-or-explain
mandate. Hong Kong offers an example of a gradual transition from
voluntary ESG disclosure guidance to a soft mandate that
264
See SINGAPORE STOCK EXCHANGE (SGX-ST) LISTING RULE 711A &
SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING
GUIDE
(July
20,
2016),
http://rulebook.sgx.com/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/s/g/SGX_Mainboard_P
ractice_Note_7.6_July_20_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE6J-8L3W] (describing a
similar stakeholder-oriented, principles-based comply-or-explain approach which
was adopted by the Singapore Stock Exchange in 2016 after first introducing its
rules as a voluntary reporting framework).
265
See HKEX, EXCHANGE PUBLISHES CONSULTATION PAPER ON PROPOSED
CHANGES TO ITS ESG GUIDE (July 17, 2015), https://www.hkex.com.hk
[https://perma.cc/9542-Y97J] (discussing the 2015 reforms).
266
See HKEX ESG GUIDE, supra note 258, at para. 7.
267
See GRI, LINKING THE GRI STANDARDS AND THE HKEX ESG REPORTING GUIDE,
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/resource-download-center/linkingthe-gri-standards-and-hkex-esg-reporting-guide/
[https://perma.cc/T7QAS3GE].
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encourages more prescriptive disclosures. By setting minimum
standards for private reporting frameworks, the Hong Kong stock
exchange has also utilized meta-regulation to promote greater
harmonization and consistency in reporting practice.
3.2.7. China
Given China’s centralized political system and the constraints it
imposes on private enterprise and civil society, it is not surprising
that China has developed a state-led approach to non-financial
reporting. What is surprising, however, is the degree to which the
Chinese non-financial reporting landscape, like the other
jurisdictions surveyed in this Article, relies heavily on private
regulation and enforcement, and defers to corporate managers’ own
judgments on the scope and form of disclosure.
Institutionally, China’s approach to non-financial reporting is
designed to advance broader public policy and regulatory goals,
such as sustainable development, poverty alleviation, and reducing
the harmful impacts of corporate activities. 268 Non-financial
reporting is further supported by a range of central and sub-national
government initiatives to promote CSR and sustainable
development, as well as by peer pressure from industry leaders and
foreign corporations that have embraced sustainability reporting.269
Although most companies are not subject to non-financial
reporting mandates, such requirements have been introduced to a
growing number of China’s largest firms, including those listed on
268
See Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze (上市公司治理准则) [Code of Corporate
Governance of Listed Companies] (promulgated by China Securities Regulatory
Commission, Jan. 7, 2002; rev’d by China Securities Regulatory Commission, Sept.
30, 2018) at §§ 1, 2, & ch. VII, respectively [hereinafter CSRC Code],
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/DepartmentRules/201904/P0
20190415336431477120.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT8T-YJMV] (noting that examples
in corporate governance include protections for minority shareholders,
independent director requirements, and, most recently, investor stewardship
guidelines); see also Guiding Opinions, supra note 46 (establishing a policy
framework for “greening” the financial system and anticipating the need for
reliable information on the financial impacts of environmental risk).
269 See generally Virginia Harper Ho, Beyond Regulation: A Comparative Look at
State-Centric Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law in China, 46 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 375 (2013) [hereinafter Harper Ho, Beyond Regulation] (discussing
examples of these policies).
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its stock exchanges, over the past decade. China’s non-financial
reporting rules and policies are administered primarily by the CSRC
and mainland Chinese stock exchanges, which are under CSRC
oversight.270 Since 2012, CSR reporting has been mandatory for the
largest state-sector firms under policies adopted by the State-owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). 271
Environmental reporting is also required for companies listed on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and for companies in certain
indices on either of China’s exchanges.272 Sustainability reporting
has been encouraged by Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) guidance
dating back to 2006. 273 In 2018, the CSRC amended its corporate
governance code for listed companies to require disclosure of
environmental, poverty alleviation efforts and “other social
responsibilities,” to the extent that “more specific regulations or
departmental rules” clarify the precise content of such disclosures.274
This code also encourages voluntary disclosure of “information that
may impact the decisionmaking of shareholders and other
stakeholders, besides disclosing information [required by]
mandatory provisions.” 275 China’s framework for establishing a
270
These measures are separate from those imposing disclosure obligations
under the environmental laws, which are beyond the scope of this Article.
271
See SASAC, Notice of the Guiding Opinion Regarding the CSR
Implementation of Centrally Managed Enterprises (关于印发《关于中央企业履行
社会责任的指导意见》的通知) [SASAC CSR Notice] (promulgated by SASAC, Dec.
29, 2007, effective Jan. 4, 2008), arts. 1–8, 18–19 (noting that the guidelines were
made mandatory for central SOEs in 2012). See also Harper Ho, Beyond Regulation,
supra note 269, at 409.
272
See Notice on Strengthening Listed Companies’ Assumption of Social
Responsibility and on Issuing the Guidelines on Listed Companies’ Environmental
Information Disclosure (关于加强公司社会责任承担工作暨发布《上海证券交易所
上市公司环境信息披露指引》的通知) (promulgated by Shanghai Stock Exchange,
May 14, 2008), arts. 2–3 (encouraging disclosure of information regarding pollution
levels and mitigation efforts and mandating disclosure for firms identified as
“serious polluters” by the MEE).
273
See Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Instructions to Listed
Companies
(Sept.
25,
2006),
at
art.
9
&
art.
36,
http://www.szse.cn/English/rules/siteRule/t20070604_559475.html
[https://perma.cc/ZPC4-ZM8M] (regarding basic disclosure and voluntary
sustainability reporting); Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) Main Board Guidelines,
at
ch.
9,
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD630.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PN5Y-KV5B].
274
See CSRC Code, supra note 268, at art. 95.
275 See id. at art. 91.
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green financial system anticipates that all companies listed on
China’s stock exchanges will be subject to mandatory environmental
disclosures on a comply-or-explain basis by 2020, although at the
time of this writing this has yet to be implemented. 276 Many
mainland financial institutions and other large firms are also crosslisted on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (so-called “red chip”
stocks) and are therefore subject to the HKEx’s mandatory ESG
disclosure requirements.277
Although ESG disclosures under all of these regimes are
increasingly prescriptive, their scope is limited. As a result, China’s
“mandatory” reporting regime, like those of the other jurisdictions
surveyed here, defers in practice largely to private standard setters
to develop reporting frameworks, and corporations have discretion
on what disclosures to provide, which reporting frameworks to use,
and how to report non-financial information.
Government CSR policies, state-backed reporting standards,
and government-backed awards encouraging sustainability
reporting represent a form of partnership, as they all incorporate or
draw heavily on private regulation in the form of internationally
accepted reporting frameworks and best practices, as well as on
international treaties and non-binding standards developed by the
United Nations, the OECD, and other bodies. 278 Current nonfinancial reporting guidelines do not specifically endorse
international reporting standards, but the CSRC, the Ministry of
Environment and Ecology (MEE), and other central government
agencies look to frameworks such as the GRI Standards and the CDP
as a point of reference. Although the Chinese central government
may at times favor local hybrid standards over private international
standards, China does not require firms to follow state-sponsored

276
See IOSCO, SUSTAINABLE FINANCE IN EMERGING MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF
SECURITIES
REGULATORS
(2019),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD630.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8V8S-Q526].
277
See supra Section 3.2.6 (discussing of the Hong Kong ESG disclosure
framework).
278 See Harper Ho, Beyond Regulation, supra note 269, at 404–05, 412.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss2/1

2019]

Private Ordering in Public Reporting

315

CSR or ESG disclosure standards, and so does not in fact preempt or
displace private ordering.279
Beyond these kinds of hybrid public-private mandates, there are
also other examples of public-private partnership in the Chinese
reporting context. For example, the main state-affiliated standard
setter for non-financial reporting in China, the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (CASS), and the GRI have taken steps to harmonize
the CASS CSR reporting standards with the GRI Standards.280
In sum, the dominant forms of public-private interaction in
China are partnership and soft mandates. Although China is a
jurisdiction that exhibits a high degree of regulatory strength, its
non-financial reporting policies and standards draw heavily on
private models. Moreover, like other jurisdictions, its disclosure
mandates defer strongly to private ordering and apply only to
certain large firms.
4.

OPTIMIZING PUBLIC-PRIVATE INTERACTIONS IN ESG DISCLOSURE

The case studies in Section 3 illustrate different forms of
interaction between public and private reporting regimes and show
how governments have transitioned toward a more regulatory
approach to ESG disclosure while accommodating and building on
private ordering. These examples further demonstrate the range of
potential policy options for public-private interaction in nonfinancial reporting outlined in Section 2, ranging from regulatory
deference to private ordering on one end to mandatory disclosure
rules on the other.
From the diverse case studies presented in Section 3, several
general observations can be made. Each of these jurisdictions has
implemented ESG disclosure through a different balance of public
regulation and private ordering. The case studies show that
regulators rely heavily on private ordering even when transitioning
279
The Chinese central government’s backing of sub-national reporting
standards as an alternative to international private standards could alternatively be
viewed as a form of weak displacement.
280
See GRI, LINKING CASS CSR 3.0 AND GRI’S G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
GUIDELINES, https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/Linking-CASSCSR-3.0-and-GRI%27s-G4-Sustainability%20Reporting-Guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GNC6-9XEM] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
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to non-financial reporting mandates. They also suggest that
governments are hesitant to delegate rulemaking authority to
specific private standard setters, and that evolving non-financial
reporting rules reflect the view in many jurisdictions that the
investor-oriented rationales of mandatory disclosure should align
with underlying public policies that support sustainable
development or address corporate impacts on stakeholders. There
is also considerable variation in the content of disclosure rules, as
well as some convergence in the integration of ESG information in
corporate annual reports about material financial risks. Notably,
none of the jurisdictions surveyed in Section 3 attempts to preempt
private ordering.
Our objective in this Article is not to advocate for a particular
model of non-financial reporting or for specific ESG disclosure rules.
Rather, in light of the market-based origins of ESG disclosure and
the important benefits offered by both public regulation and private
ordering, we argue that hybrid approaches to non-financial
reporting are a more efficient path to developing harmonized
reporting rules, even though our case studies show that this
potential has yet to be realized in most jurisdictions. Drawing on
the observations and arguments in Section 2 and 3, the following
discussion shows how optimal hybrid public-private disclosure
models can work. We propose that future reforms should continue
to draw on or defer to evolving private standards and frameworks
where flexibility and innovation are at a premium. However, public
regulators and mandatory reporting frameworks are necessary to
promote the accessibility, reliability, and comparability of nonfinancial information. Here, we explore how regulators, such as the
SEC, can leverage, harmonize, and legitimize private ordering to
achieve these goals through the regulatory strategies presented in
this Article.
4.1. Leveraging Private Ordering
As the cases in Section 3 show, governments seeking to foster
more robust ESG disclosure have leveraged private reporting
standards through support, partnership, delegation, and
mandating. These forms of public-private engagement can reduce
regulatory costs while increasing regulatory effectiveness.
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Leveraging enables governments to benefit from one of private
regulation’s relative strengths: its flexibility and responsiveness to
the perceived needs of investors.281 Both investors and regulators
face a heightened need to respond to rapidly changing market
conditions and risks in global financial markets.282 Public regulators
can tailor disclosure requirements to the needs of specific industries
and respond to emerging risks more nimbly by drawing on private
standards or by collaborating with firms, private standard-setting
bodies, or industry associations.283 Governments are also uniquely
positioned to ensure that disclosure rules align with broader public
policy goals, ranging from market stability to ensuring that systemic
non-financial risks, such as climate risk, are disclosed (and priced)
in the market. Depending on the jurisdiction, these policy goals may
also include aligning financial regulation with sustainable
development goals and related public policies.
Leveraging can be undertaken at various stages in the publicprivate collaborative relationship. In all of the jurisdictions
analyzed in Section 3, government regulators and/or stock
exchanges have leveraged existing private standards, as well as
international soft law standards, by consulting them in the creation
of their non-financial reporting rules,284 and actively seeking to align
their non-financial reporting rules with private ESG disclosure
standards. 285 The EU, the U.K., and Hong Kong have leveraged
private standards most directly by permitting reporting companies
to comply by using accepted private disclosure standards. 286
Leveraging private standards already accepted by trade and
industry associations can also free financial and securities regulators

See Vogel, supra note 108, at 264.
See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 142, at 890 (arguing that soft law has taken
root “out of necessity . . . [and] the speed, flexibility, and expertise that
international securities regulation requires.”).
283 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 118, at 526.
284
See supra Section 3 (describing commonly referenced standards including
GRI Standards, the SASB sector-specific standards, the CDP climate-related
disclosure framework and the OECD Guidelines).
285 See, e.g., supra Section 3.2.3 (discussing B3’s engagement with GRI and the
IIRC); supra Section 3.2.6 (discussing the HKEx’s engagement with GRI).
286 See, e.g., supra Section 3.2.4 (discussing the EU Directive’s recognition of
“national frameworks, [EU]-based frameworks . . . or other recognized
international frameworks”).
281
282
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to focus on helping firms connect this information to financial
impacts for investors.287
One concern with leveraging, however, is that it may call on
public regulators to assess the relative value of private regimes and
determine which ones to support, endorse, or even incorporate in
regulation, which could inhibit private innovation in the
formulation, implementation, and enforcement of private
standards. However, as the jurisdiction-specific case studies in
Section 3.2 show, governments thus far have avoided endorsing any
particular private framework and have instead endorsed private
disclosure regimes via guidance, while deferring to companies’ own
choices of reporting standard. Other possibilities regulators can
consider include waiting until clear market leaders emerge or
designating certain standards as a regulatory safe harbor while
allowing competing standards to evolve.
As has been the case with financial reporting, monitoring and
enforcing compliance with new non-financial reporting
requirements will require the combined efforts of regulatory
agencies, shareholders, advocacy organizations, and private
intermediaries such as auditors and credit rating agencies. Even
greater cost savings may arise from leveraging private actors to
engage in gatekeeping, oversight, and enforcement, which can help
overcome regulators’ lack of resources to provide audit and
assurance services or to identify and pursue violations of disclosure
mandates.288 Just as financial reporting leverages the expertise of
accountants and auditors, integrating ESG disclosure into corporate
annual reports requires reliance on these same professionals and on
other experts to assist companies with compliance, provide
assurance services, and aid regulators in crafting sensible disclosure
rules in areas such as environmental and social risk that may be
beyond their traditional areas of expertise.289
Of course, regulators may also incur costs associated with
leveraging private standards. These costs include oversight of
See EITI, supra note 57; ISO 26000 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 58.
Freeman, Private Role, supra note 114, at 660.
289 See Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Global Private Governance: Lessons from a
National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225,
230–31 (2005) (noting the relatively higher costs incurred by governments in
maintaining specialized regulatory expertise vis-à-vis private actors that can derive
positive externalities from such expertise).
287
288
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assurance providers and other third parties with which
governments partner or to whom they delegate. 290 Coordination
between private standard setters and public regulators across
multiple jurisdictions is necessary as well, and the global scope and
distinct methodologies of existing private ESG disclosure
frameworks may increase these oversight costs. 291 However, soft
law-based global governance regimes that engage regulators with
private disclosure regimes, such as IOSCO’s recently-established
sustainable finance network, offer promise as a means to facilitate
this type of coordination.292
4.2. Harmonizing Private Ordering
As described in Section 1, the key weakness of private ordering
that is driving regulators to introduce new ESG disclosure reforms
is the fragmentation and lack of consistency of reporting content,
format, timing, and scope. These features have made ESG
information reported outside of corporate annual reports costly to
obtain, difficult to analyze, and almost impossible to compare with
information disclosed in public filings. Public-private engagement
can help address this fundamental problem by facilitating the
harmonization of private ESG disclosure regimes and their
alignment with public disclosure rules, thereby reducing costs for
investors and encouraging adoption by market participants.
Nonetheless, harmonization requires government intervention since
any coordination or integration of public and private regimes must
be initiated by the appropriate legislative or regulatory bodies and
should align with the materiality standards that already apply to
financial reporting in the given jurisdiction.
The regulatory strategies outlined in Section 2 and the models of
public-private interaction adopted by the countries surveyed in
Section 3 suggest some of the parameters of an optimal framework
McAllister, Third Party Verification, supra note 145, at 44.
See, e.g., TCFD FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 33 (noting concerns about the
administrative burden of multiple disclosure frameworks and mandatory reporting
requirements).
292
IOSCO, supra note 32, at 4 (noting IOSCO’s establishment of a Sustainable
Finance Network of securities regulators).
290
291
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for non-financial reporting within corporate annual reports and
other public filings. Most obviously, regulators can standardize
reporting through more prescriptive rules, such as the U.K.’s
greenhouse gas emissions disclosure rules, South Africa’s apply-orexplain principles, or the specific disclosures required by China’s
CSRC and by the stock exchanges in mainland China and Hong
Kong. Less directly, regulators can facilitate harmonization through
meta-regulation—that is, by requiring that private reporting
standards satisfy certain criteria with regard to format, reporting
period, or the use of particular indicators. By aligning ESG
disclosure with existing financial reporting, these efforts also
improve comparability. Both the EU Directive and the HKEx’s
listing standards essentially do this by allowing issuers to rely on
separate sustainability reporting that nonetheless meets the
minimum standards for non-financial reports.
In addition,
partnership with third-party intermediaries that collect, organize,
process, and disseminate information can promote harmonization
by enabling communication with regulators regarding companies’
ability to process, analyze, and otherwise use non-financial
information mandated by regulators.
Greater harmonization can also be balanced with flexibility. For
example, the EU Directive and most of the jurisdictions surveyed in
Section 3 use principles-based disclosure and a comply-or-explain
approach to promote flexibility. At the same time, they encourage
or support more prescriptive disclosures.
In all of these
jurisdictions, regulators have implemented non-financial reporting
reforms only with respect to listed firms or a defined set of “large”
firms for whom the reporting requirements may be relatively less
novel or burdensome and whose experience might set the standard
for smaller companies to follow. While greater deference to private
standards within new mandatory regimes may slow the pace of
harmonization, this flexibility leaves space for market oversight and
private ordering to continue to drive best practices.
4.3. Legitimizing Private Ordering
Beyond the benefits of harmonization, the interaction of public
regulation and private ordering in non-financial reporting reform
bolsters the legitimacy of existing private disclosure standards. As
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a specific genus of private governance, these private ESG disclosure
regimes are vulnerable to critiques about their legitimacy.293 First,
private reporting frameworks and other private governance regimes
often lack the transparency and public participation that is part of
the legislative or administrative rulemaking processes.294 This form
of legitimacy, known as input legitimacy, focuses on the
participatory qualities of rulemaking. In domestic legal systems, the
legitimacy of public regulation is derived from its authorization by
a democratically elected legislature. 295 Administrative law is
devoted to creating procedures to hold unelected regulators to
account through procedural safeguards. 296 In contrast, private
governance regimes do not enjoy such democratic legitimacy. 297
Instead, private reporting standards derive their legitimacy from the
market, as evidenced by their market share relative to competing
standards.
A second form of legitimacy, output legitimacy, focuses on the
substantive outcomes of rulemaking,298 which may be undercut by
weak monitoring and enforcement power.
This allows
“decoupling” or greenwashing—i.e., the superficial ceremonial
adoption of compliant policies that are at odds with inconsistent
corporate practices. 299
Specifically, voluntary sustainability
reporting enables decoupling if firms are permitted to disclose
favorable information and hide unfavorable information, fail to
adequately contextualize their disclosures, or provide false or

293 See Park, Investors as Regulators, supra note 29, at 30–38 (noting legitimacy
deficits in privately-governed sustainable finance markets).
294
Freeman, Private Role, supra note 114, at 647.
295 See BRUMMER, supra note 164, at 183.
296 See Mendelson, supra note 150, at 771–72.
297 See Peer Zumbansen, The Constitutional Itch: Transnational Private Regulatory
Governance and the Woes of Legitimacy, in NEGOTIATING STATE AND NON-STATE LAW:
THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL AND LOCAL LEGAL PLURALISM 83, 96 (Michael A. Helfand,
ed., 2015).
298 See BRUMMER, supra note 164, at 179.
299
Ariel Meyerstein, Transnational Private Financial Regulation and Sustainable
Development: An Empirical Assessment of the Implementation of the Equator Principles,
45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 487, 542–43 (2013). See also Patricia Bromley & Walter
W. Powell, From Smoke and Mirrors to Walking the Talk: Decoupling in the
Contemporary World, 6 ACAD. MGMT. ANN. 483, 490–97 (2012) (identifying
decoupling arising from unimplemented or routinely violated rules as one of two
types of decoupling).
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deliberately misleading disclosures.300 ESG disclosure in any form
can become ritualistic and cosmetic if the reporting process is
detached from the information flows that drive corporate
decisionmaking.301 It may also provide false comfort to corporate
management about the company’s environmental and social
policies, thereby obscuring the need to address how well these
corporate policies and practices are working.302
Public-private engagement can therefore bolster both the input
and output legitimacy of non-state ESG disclosure standards and
frameworks. Through endorsement, partnership, and mandating
through incorporation into regulation, governments can publicly
recognize specific standards and standard-setters as the EU has
done in its reporting guidance; these measures give private
standards input legitimacy in the eyes of investors and
stakeholders.303 By partnering with private actors and incorporating
private standards into disclosure rules, governments can also
promote their legitimacy by subjecting private ESG standards to
administrative process, legislative oversight, and public
accountability.304 Regulators can also enhance input legitimacy by
endorsing or facilitating private ESG regimes that engage
shareholders and other stakeholders in the creation of reporting
standards. 305 Finally, requiring companies to file sustainability
reports with the public regulator, as is required by government
300
David Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance
Regulation: Disclosure, Dialogue, and Development, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 447, 462 (2008).
See also IRRC, supra note 24, at 27–37 (noting that current voluntary reporting
practice is subject to all of these limitations).
301
Hess, supra note 300, at 465.
302
Chiu, supra note 13, at 382–86.
303
See Gulbrandsen, supra note 127, at 86 (referring generally to the
legitimating function of incorporation).
304 See Mendelson, supra note 150, at 767–90 (explaining the importance of
these processes).
305
See Park, Investors as Regulators, supra note 29, at 45–46 (proposing
regulatory incentives for stakeholder participation in private governance-based
sustainable finance regimes). As noted above, many ESG disclosure frameworks,
such as the GRI Standards, define materiality in terms of corporate impact on
stakeholders and encourage companies to engage with stakeholders to determine
what information they deem significant enough to disclose. See, e.g. GRI, supra note
81, 102–46 & 102–47, at 34–35 (regarding identification of reporting scope and
material topics). Stakeholder engagement is essential if the regulatory framework
defines materiality in terms of stakeholder impacts.
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regulators in Brazil and the U.K. and by the stock exchanges in Hong
Kong and mainland China, enhances the output legitimacy of
private ESG standards by lowering the cost of accessing this
information, both for investors and stakeholders.
5.

CONCLUSION

By distilling the theoretical literature on public-private hybridity
and drawing on the experience of leading jurisdictions worldwide,
this Article shows how regulators and policymakers can work with
private actors to develop and implement reporting frameworks to
meet investor demand for non-financial information. Since they
build on existing disclosure practices, these approaches can also
generate cost-savings and other efficiencies for regulators, investors,
and firms, and enable the dissemination of ESG information more
effectively than either public regulation or private ordering alone.
Far from undermining private ordering, governments’ multifaceted role in non-financial reporting reform can give it force. At
the same time, the case studies presented in this Article indicate that
the benefits of greater deference to private ordering must be
weighed against the need for harmonization and legitimacy that
governments are well-positioned to address. Fortunately, as the
United States and other governments consider the need for new
approaches to ESG disclosure, they can draw useful lessons from the
experience of those countries that have already taken these crucial
first steps.
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Appendix I. Institutional Features of Selected Jurisdictions306
U.S.

South
Africa

Brazil

U.K.

Hong Kong

China
(PRC)

Europe

Asia

Asia

Mature

Mature

EU
Region

N.
America

Africa

S. America

Europe

Developmental Stage
Mature Developing Developing

Mature

Mature

Legal Tradition307
Common Mixed civil,
law
common &
indigenous
law;
Commonwealth

Civil law

Civil law Common law; Common
Commonlaw;
wealth
Commonwealth

Civil law,
socialist
and
common
law
elements

Corporate Governance
BoardBoardBoardBoardcentric;
centric;
centric;
centric;
share- stakeholder stakeholder stakeholder-oriented
-oriented
holderoriented
oriented

Share-holdercentric;
“enlightened
shareholder
value”

Shareholdercentric;
shareholderoriented

Statecentric &
boardcentric;
stakeholder
-oriented

Source: Authors’ compilation (various).
These categories reflect the dominant foundation of the legal system, but
we acknowledge that lines between these traditions have blurred with the rise of
the regulatory state in many of these systems, and with the advent of globalization.
See Mary Ann Glendon, Sources of Law in a Changing Legal Order, 17 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 663, 665–84 (1987) (discussing the convergence of common and civil law
systems).
306
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Appendix I (cont.). Institutional Features of Selected
Jurisdictions
U.S.

South
Africa

Brazil

EU

U.K.

Hong Kong

China
(PRC)

Source of ESG Disclosure Regulation
Regulator Financial
(SEC) & Reporting
stock
Standard
exchanges Council
(FRSC) &
stock
exchange
(JSE)

Regulator Member
Regulators
Regulator
(CVM) &
state
(FRC, FCA) & (SFC) &
stock
financial
stock
stock
exchange regulators exchanges
exchange
(B3)
(HKEx)
& stock
exchanges

Regulator
(CSRC) &
stock
exchanges
(SHSE,
SZSE)

Basis for ESG Disclosure in Annual Reports
Prescrip- Integrated Principles- Principles- Principles-/ Principles-/ Principles-/
tive and reporting
based
based
materiality- materiality- materialityprinciples (apply or
based, and
based
based
/
explain)
necessary to
materialunderstanding
ity-based,
of the business
and
necessary
to render
disclosure
not misleading
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Appendix II. ESG Disclosure Measures in Selected
Jurisdictions308
Mandatory
Voluntary
Covered Disclosure
ESG Scope
Assurance
Comply or
Entities Placement
Explain
U.S.
Dominant Mode of Interaction: Deference
Regulation S- Securities
Mixed
MultiPublic
Annual
Optional
K
regulator
dimenreport
(SEC)
sional
Measure

Institution

2010 Climate
Guidance

Securities
regulator
(SEC)

King IV

JSE Listing
Standards

Mixed

Multidimensional

Public

Annual
report

South Africa
Dominant Modes of Interaction: Support/ Delegation
Institute of
C or E
MultiAll (opt.) Integrated
Directors in
dimenreport
sional
S. Africa
(private)
Stock
exchange

C or E (King
Code)

Multidimensional

Listed

Integrated
report

Optional

Optional

Optional

Brazil
Dominant Modes of Interaction: Support/ Delegation/ Partnership
CVM Rules Securities
Annual
MultiListed
Annual
Optional
358 & 489
regulator report (M);
dimenreport (M)
sustainsional
ability report
(V)
B3

Stock
exchange

Voluntary

Nonfinancial
factors

Listed

Annual
report (V)

Optional

308
The jurisdictions are organized by mode of interaction in order of
regulatory strength—i.e., from market-based/deferential to most state-dominated.
Sources are as referenced in footnotes, supra Section 3.2.
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Appendix II (cont.). ESG Disclosure Measures in Selected
Jurisdictions
Mandatory
Voluntary
Covered Disclosure
Measure
Institution
ESG Scope
Assurance
Comply or
Entities Placement
Explain
EU
Dominant Modes of Interaction: Deference/ Support/ Delegation
2014 NonVaries by
C or E
Multi- Large firms Annual
Optional
finan.
Member
dimen(“public
report;
Disclosure
State
sional
interest
sustainDirective
entities”)
ability
report (V)
U.K.
Dominant Modes of Interaction: Deference/ Support/ Mandate
Companies
Business
C or E
Envt’l,
Large
Annual
Act 2006,
regulator
human firms; add’l
report
Regulations (U.K. Dept.
rights,
for listed
(2013), Part
diversity
for Bus.,
XV & XVI
Innov. &
Skills)
U.K.
Corporate
Governance
Code 2018

Audit
required

Financial
Reporting
Council
(private)

Mandatory

Risk
mgmt.

Listed

Annual
report

Audit
required

London Stock FCA (U.K.
Exchange ESG Listing
Listing Guide Authority)

Voluntary

Multidimensional

Listed

Annual
report,
sustainability
report, or
integrated
report

Optional

Corporate
Governance
Code (2014)

Hong Kong
Dominant Modes of Interaction: Support/ Mandate
Stock
C or E;
Risk
Summary
exchange mandatory
mgmt.
financial
(HKEx)
reports;
annual
reports

HKEx Listing
Stock
Rules App. 16 exchange
(HKEx)
(ESG
Disclosure)
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Appendix II (cont.). ESG Disclosure Measures in Selected
Jurisdictions
Mandatory
Voluntary
Covered Disclosure
Measure
Institution
ESG Scope
Assurance
Comply or
Entities Placement
Explain
China (PRC)
Dominant Modes of Interaction: Partnership/ Mandate
Corporate
Securities Voluntary
MultiListed
N/A
N/A
Governance regulator
dimenCode
(CSRC)
sional
Shanghai
Stock
Exchange
Listing Rules

Stock
Envt’l report
exchange (M); Sustainability report
(V)

Multidimensional

Certain
SOEs;
listed

Envt’l
report
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Shenzhen
Stock
SustainStock
exchange ability report
Exchange CSR
(V)
Guidance

Multidimensional

Listed

Sustainability
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Optional

Multidimensional

Central
SOEs
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report

Optional

SASAC 2008
CSR
Guidelines
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